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HONG KONG, CHINA, AND THE DISRUPTION OF
ANTITRUST
Emanuela Lecchi*
Abstract: Under the “One Country, Two Systems” rule, Hong Kong
and China maintain different legal systems. This dichotomy also applies in the
antitrust context. China adopted its Anti-Monopoly Law in 2007, while Hong
Kong waited until 2012 to introduce its Competition Ordinance (and another
three years to fully implement it). This article compares the antitrust laws of
these two jurisdictions and their enforcement in light of a turning point: the
disruption caused by Big Tech. Interestingly, while the competition laws of
Hong Kong and China are substantively similar to each other and to legal
precedent in other jurisdictions, Hong Kong has adopted an adversarial system
of enforcement, and China an administrative system. Through an analysis of
recent antitrust developments in the two jurisdictions, this article shows the
importance of agency independence, due process, and robust judicial scrutiny
for the proper functioning of an administrative system of enforcement. This
article also demonstrates that judicial scrutiny in an adversarial system needs
the certainty of legal rules, particularly to clarify the burden of proof to be met
by the competition authorities. In light of these findings, this article proposes a
three-pronged competition and regulation approach for the scrutiny of Big Tech
that does not water down the two principles of due process and robust judicial
scrutiny. This is significant. The frustration with market concentration should
not lead policymakers to propose changes to antitrust enforcement that could
weaken these two principles and attribute a higher value to the speed of
decision-making over the importance of a thorough analysis.
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INTRODUCTION
Digital platforms do not just disrupt “incumbent industries,” they
also disrupt “academic imaginations about the future course of
capitalism.”1 And not just academic imaginations, but also the way that
policymakers conceive of antitrust and how competition authorities view
their mandate. The recent crackdown on the platform economy2 in China
has given a new dimension to this debate. On one hand, the manner and
speed with which China has been able to curb its Big Tech companies3
appears enviable to enforcement agencies worldwide. But this approach
shows that issues arise when agencies are granted wide discretion with
limited judicial oversight. On the other hand, Hong Kong has so far
escaped the international trend towards antitrust review of the power of Big
1

Gernot Grabher & Jonas König, Disruption, Embedded. A Polanyan Framing of the Platform
Economy, 14 SOCIOLOGICA 95, 95 (2020).
2
In this article, the term platform economy is used to refer to economic and social activity
facilitated by tech platforms. These provide services including “online intermediation services,” “online
search engines,” “online social networking sites,” “video-sharing platform services,” “numberindependent interpersonal communication services,” and “advertising services.” See Commission
Regulation 2020/0374 of December 15, 2020, Contestable and Fair Markets in the Digital Section, 2020
O.J. (L 842) 34–35.
3
The term “Big Tech companies” is used to refer to the giants of the platform economy. In the
West, these are often referred to by the acronym GAFAM (Google (Alphabet), Apple, Facebook (Meta),
Amazon and Microsoft). When referring to the Chinese ecosystem, the acronym often used is BATX
(Baidu, Alibaba, Tencent, and Xiaomi).
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Tech. This may seem surprising in light of the cooperation between the
competition authorities in the two jurisdictions. But looking at the
provisions of the competition law and the judicial interpretation of the
burden of proof,4 it becomes clear that, in Hong Kong, the competition
authority faces challenges in seeking to tackle issues of antitrust in the
platform economy effectively.
China and Hong Kong share several cultural norms,5 but have very
different histories. Since 1997, Hong Kong has been part of China but has
retained its own economic and administrative system under the
constitutional principle known as the “One Country, Two Systems” rule.
Both jurisdictions have adopted competition law recently, and the newly
formed authorities are grappling with how to establish their legal authority
whilst facing different constraints. In China, the main constraint is internal
bureaucracy, resulting in a swinging pendulum between lax and strict
regulation.6 What makes China exceptional in its regulation of Big Tech
“is not why it regulates, but rather how it regulates its tech firms.”7 As more
particularly detailed below,8 China’s administrative form of enforcement
guarantees impressive results, often at the expenses of scrutiny,
accountability, and due process. In Hong Kong, the main constraints faced
by competition authorities are the business community and the judiciary.
The business community views the application of competition law as
imposing unnecessary constraints on existing free markets. And the
judiciary is still unused to the enforcement of competition law and the
difficulties of assessing complex economic evidence.9
Therefore, the comparison analysis in this article demonstrates that
the form of antitrust intervention matters.
It is true that the glacial pace of competition law enforcement in
some jurisdictions is cause for concern. 10 But this does not mean that
procedural guarantees should be watered down. The new mistrust of
procedural guarantees, including judicial review,11 shown by policymakers
4

The competition authority needs to meet the criminal standard of burden of proof to impose
financial penalties, see infra Section III.A.
5
Chee Kiong Tong, Rethinking Chinese Business, in CHINESE BUSINESS, RETHINKING GUANXI
AND TRUST IN CHINESE BUSINESS NETWORKS (Chee-Kiong Tong ed., 2014); see also Andreas Stephan,
Cartel Laws Undermined: Corruption, Social Norms and Collectivist Business Cultures, 37 J.L. & SOC’Y
345, 354–65 (2010).
6
The “volatile style of policymaking” in China is a result of the interaction of four key players:
the top leadership, the agencies, the firms and the public. See Angela H. Zhang, Agility over Stability:
China’s Great Reversal in Regulating the Platform Economy, 63 HARV. INT’L L.J. (forthcoming 2022)
[hereinafter Zhang, Agility over Stability].
7
Id. (manuscript at 5).
8
See infra Section III.B.
9
See infra Section III.A.
10
See infra Section IV.
11
See Pablo Ibáñez Colomo, When did the Rule of Law Come to be Seen as an Inconvenience?,
CHILLIN’ COMPETITION BLOG (June 30, 2021), https://chillingcompetition.com/2021/06/30/when-didthe-rule-of-law-come-to-be-seen-as-an-inconvenience/ [hereinafter Colomo, Rule of Law].
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and competition authorities in other countries when they make the case for
expanding the powers of the competition authorities 12 and reducing
procedural protections13 is a cause for concern.
Considering the Chinese approach within the context of different
systems internationally, this article proposes a three-pronged approach to
curbing anticompetitive practices in the platform economy.14 First, in fastmoving, dynamic markets where the need to act swiftly is greater, the
authorities should consider limiting investigations to a narrow market and
a specific issue. This focused approach would limit the complexity of the
theory of harm to be proven and reduce the time it takes to issue a decision.
Second, authorities should still bring cases that allege novel theories of
harm to deal with a changing competitive landscape. These cases will be
time-consuming to investigate and will be likely appealed. Far from
viewing this negatively, taking the time to investigate and providing an
avenue for appeals in novel cases are important avenues for the
development of antitrust analysis. Third, regulation of “super platforms”15
should be encouraged. This allows for the imposition of regulatory
requirements on platforms with market power. These powerful regulatory
tools can be used to address the root causes of the anticompetitive behavior
alongside the assessment of individual cases in competition law.
Section I of this article provides a brief background on the adoption
of competition laws in Hong Kong and China and then covers the
substantive provisions of the laws. Section II compares the tools available
for detection and enforcement in the two jurisdictions. Section III assesses
the advantages and disadvantages of the adversarial enforcement system in
Hong Kong and compares it to the administrative enforcement system in
China. Section IV reflects on the speed of action and effectiveness of
remedies discussed in Section III. Assessing the findings as a whole,
Section IV proposes a three-pronged approach for a competition and

12

For example, there have been recent Government proposals in the U.K. to speed up merger
investigations. See, e.g., DEP’T FOR BUS., ENERGY & INDUS. STRATEGY, REFORMING COMPETITION AND
CONSUMER POLICY, 49–51, 53–56 (2021) (pledging “stronger and faster enforcement against illegal
anticompetitive conduct) [hereinafter U.K. GOV’T PROPOSAL]. These proposals were the subject of
extensive consultation. On 20 April 2022, the U.K. Government published its response. Not all the
proposals will be brought forward. See DEP’T FOR BUS., ENERGY & INDUS. STRATEGY, REFORMING
COMPETITION AND CONSUMER POLICY: GOVERNMENT RESPONSE (2022) [hereinafter U.K. GOV’T
RESPONSE].
13
U.K. GOV’T PROPOSAL, supra note 12, at 70–72 (a proposal to limit judicial scrutiny of the
authority’s decisions in competition law matters). In the end, the U.K. Government decided not to adopt
this proposal. See U.K. GOV’T RESPONSE, supra note 12, at 41. Appeals against interim measure
decisions by the competition authority will be determined by reference to the principles of judicial
review. See id. at 33.
14
See infra Section IV.C.
15
Sandra Marco Colino, The Incursion of Antitrust into China’s Platform Economy, ANTITRUST
BULL. (forthcoming Feb. 2022) (manuscript at 31) (https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=4031375) (describing the use of the term “super platforms”) [hereinafter Colino, Incursion of Antitrust].
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regulation intervention. This could be a blueprint for other jurisdictions
that are in the process of adopting regulatory measures to tackle Big Tech.
I.

COMPETITION LAW IN CHINA AND HONG KONG

China and Hong Kong are both relatively new to competition law.
Though the emergence of competition law in both jurisdictions has been
markedly different, both regimes were met with substantial opposition by
industry and government. In a socialist country like China, competition law
was considered a tool towards the developments of free markets, which
were viewed with suspicion. And in a capitalistic society like Hong Kong,
competition law was seen with suspicion for the opposite reason—as
imposing unnecessary constraints on existing free markets. Thus, the
adoption of a comprehensive competition law in Hong Kong and China is
equally surprising.
In Hong Kong, the Competition Ordinance (CO)16 was adopted after
two decades of debate “as to whether such legislation was compatible with
the region’s free market economy.” 17 Following a three-year long
implementation period, the CO entered into force only in December 2015.
In China, the Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) 18 entered into force in 2008
“after fourteen years of wrangling and debate.”19
Notwithstanding the differences in the two jurisdictions, when the
AML and CO were adopted, the substantive provisions of the laws were
remarkably similar. As will be discussed in this paper, both were modelled
after similar laws from the European Union and Singapore. However, a key
difference in each jurisdiction’s approach to competition law is that Hong
Kong employs an adversarial system of enforcement and China utilizes an
administrative one.
Subsection A below discusses the prohibition of anticompetitive
agreements in Hong Kong and in China. In Hong Kong, the only case
brought in the digital sector to date concerned vertical agreements.20 The
reported cases in China are mostly against domestic Big Tech for abuse of
16

Competition Ordinance, (2015) Cap. 619 (H.K.) [hereinafter Competition Ordinance].
Sandra Marco Colino, Distribution Agreements under China’s Anti-Monopoly Law and the
Hong Kong Competition Ordinance, 1 CHINA ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 2 (2017) [hereinafter Colino,
Distribution Agreements].
18
Zhōnghuá rénmín gònghéguó fǎn lǒngduàn fǎ (中华人民共和国反垄断法) [Anti-Monopoly
Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, effective Aug. 1, 2008)
[hereinafter China Anti-Monopoly Law].
19
Angela H. Zhang, Taming the Chinese Leviathan: Is Antitrust Regulation a False Hope?, 51
STAN. J. INT’L L. 195, 196 (2015) [hereinafter Zhang, Taming the Chinese Leviathan].
20
Competition Comm’n v. Online Travel Agents, [2020] H.K.C.C. 1, EC/02NJ (H.K.) [hereinafter
Online Travel Agents]. In this case, the HKCC accepted commitments in May 2020 and
settled the case. Commitments Register, COMPETITION COMM’N, https://www.compcomm.hk/en/
enforcement/registers/commitments/commitments_reg.html (last visited May 25, 2022); see also infra
Section II.B.
17
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a dominant position or for non-compliance with the merger rules.
Subsection B covers the prohibition of abuse of a dominant position in
Hong Kong and in China with a focus on the decisions of the Chinese
competition authorities against Big Tech. Subsection C considers the
application of merger control in both jurisdictions, and Subsection D takes
a close look at sanctions.
A.

The Prohibition of Anticompetitive Agreements: The Next
Battleground for Big Tech?

The only example of enforcement in the digital sector in Hong Kong
to date is Online Travel Agents. 21 In it, the Hong Kong Competition
Commission (HKCC) 22 investigated terms requiring suppliers using the
platforms of online travel agents not to offer better terms on other platforms
(“parity clauses”).23
In China, agreements among online marketplaces or between online
marketplaces and users of the platform do not appear to have been
investigated as anticompetitive agreements under the AML, even though
local e-commerce companies could have reportedly acted as
whistleblowers on cartels in the courier industry.24 This is so even though
the Antimonopoly Guidelines of the Anti-Monopoly Committee of the
State Council on the Platform Economy (Platform Economy Guidelines)25
adopted in February 2021 make it clear that the main Chinese competition
authority, the State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR),26 is
very much aware of the anticompetitive nature that agreements between
21

See Online Travel Agents, supra note 20.
The HKCC’s functions are detailed in Section 130 of the Competition Ordinance. See
Competition Ordinance, supra note 16.
23
This case was settled by the HKCC and will be considered below. See infra Section II.B.2.
24
MELBOURNE L. SCH., CHINA COMPETITION BULLETIN MARCH/APRIL 2014, 5 (Allan Fels. et al.
eds., 31st ed. 2014), https://law.unimelb.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/1796462/ChinaCompetition-Bulletin-March-April-2014.pdf [hereinafter COMPETITION BULLETIN MAR./APR. 2014]. Ecommerce companies were said to have driven down the profits of the courier companies, and this was
considered one of the reasons the cartel was formed. See also MELBOURNE L. SCH., CHINA COMPETITION
BULLETIN JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2015, 6 (Allan Fels. et al. eds., 35th ed. 2015),
https://law.unimelb.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0006/1796424/China-Competition-Bulletin-Jan-Feb2015.pdf [hereinafter COMPETITION BULLETIN JAN./FEB. 2015].
25
Guówùyuàn fǎn lǒngduàn wěiyuánhuì guānyú píngtái jīngjì lǐngyù de fǎn lǒngduàn zhǐnán (国
务院反垄断委员会关于平台经济领域的反垄断指南) [Anti-Monopoly Guidelines of the AntiMonopoly Commission of the State Council on the Platform Economy] (issued by theAnti-Monopoly
Committee of the State Council, Feb. 7, 2021) http://gkml.samr.gov.cn/nsjg/fldj/202102/t20210207_32
5967.html (China) [hereinafter Platform Economy Guidelines].
26
In China, the SAMR is the main competition authority, operating at the central level. The SAMR
is supported by Anti-monopoly Enforcement Authorities [AMEAs] at the local level. On November 19,
2021, the State Council of the People’s Republic of China announced that a new body, the National AntiMonopoly Bureau (NAMB) had been set up to deal with competition law matters. At the time of writing,
the NAMB does not appear to have issued any public statements. In this article, the SAMR will be
referred to as the main competition authority in China.
22
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platform operators and platform users can have. In the same way that the
adoption of the Platform Economy Guidelines spearheaded enforcement
against Big Tech for abuse of a dominant position, 27 the prohibition of
anticompetitive agreements may become the next battleground for Big
Tech in China.
1.

Horizontal agreements

Players in the digital economy have not been under investigation for
entering into horizontal anticompetitive agreements in China or in Hong
Kong. For now, as in many other countries, the main focus of enforcement
against horizontal agreements is the fight against price-fixing cartels in
both jurisdictions.
In China, Article 13 of the AML prohibits so-called “monopoly
agreements.”28 These include hard-core cartel agreements, such as price
fixing,29 output restrictions,30 and agreements that restrict the development
of new technologies,31 allocating markets,32 and boycotts.33 Although the
notion of a “monopoly agreement” seems to imply a measure of market
power for the parties to the agreement, it is understood that this provision
captures anticompetitive agreements, similar to Article 101 of the Treaty
on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), or the First Conduct
Rule under the Competition Ordinance of Hong Kong, referred to below.34
Anticompetitive agreements can be exempted under Article 15 of the AML
if the parties can prove that their agreements lead to improvements to
technological development or research. Similar to the conditions for the
application of Article 101(3) of TFEU, these exemptions only apply if
gains are shared by the consumers and there are no severe restrictions on
competition.35
For the purposes of writing this article, the author conducted a
review of Chinese case law and identified almost 100 cases at the central
and local level where the antitrust authorities have acted against the parties

27

See infra Section I.B.
China Anti-Monopoly Law, supra note 18, art. 13.
29
Id. art. 13(1).
30
Id. art. 13(2).
31
Id. art. 13(4).
32
Id. art. 13(3).
33
Id. art. 13(5).
34
See Colino, Distribution Agreements, supra note 17, at 22–23.
35
For example, in the case of the Mayang Shale Brick Cartel, the parties invoked Article 15, but
the exemption was not granted because the cartel had caused serious harm to competition and harmed
consumer interests. See MELBOURNE L. SCH., CHINA COMPETITION BULLETIN MAY/JUNE 2015, 5 (Allan
Fels et al. eds., 37th ed. 2015), https://law.unimelb.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0004/1796449/ChinaCompetition-Bulletin-May-June-2015.pdf.
28

364

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 31 NO. 3

for, amongst others, “price fixing.” 36 This was a valuable exercise as,
especially in the early stages of enforcement of the AML, decisions were
not made public by the authorities and reports are mainly to be found in
secondary sources. This review of cases in the public domain is not
exhaustive. The cases in the public domain do not show the full picture in
any event—many more cases appear to have been investigated than have
been disclosed. 37 Nevertheless, this review has not highlighted any cases
against players in the digital economy for entering into horizontal anticompetitive agreements. The SAMR is well aware of the potential issues,
however. Article 5 of the Platform Economy Guidelines refers to the risk
that platform operators “through data, algorithms, platform rules or other
means” may be able to achieve “substantial coordination” such that the
relevant undertakings may be unable to set the parameters of competition
independently.
In Hong Kong, anticompetitive agreements or practices are
prohibited under the so-called First Conduct Rule under the CO.38 The CO
includes a general exclusion from the First Conduct Rule for agreements
that enhance overall economic efficiency, with the same cumulative
requirements as those found in Article 101(3) of TFEU and Article 15 of
the AML. The requirements are as follows: 1) the agreement contributes to
improving production or distribution or technical or economic progress, 2)
consumers receive a fair share of the efficiencies, 3) the restriction imposed
must be indispensable, and 4) not eliminate competition altogether.39 The
HKCC interprets the relevant provisions as a “defense” that the parties can
raise in response to an allegation that the First Conduct Rule has been
contravened.40 There is nothing to stop the parties from arguing that a cartel
should be exempted. Indeed, this “defense” was already argued in one of
the first cases to be brought by the HKCC to the Hong Kong Competition
Tribunal (HKCT), 41 the Decoration Contractors cartel case. 42 In other
jurisdictions, the parties to a cartel know the difficulty of proving
efficiencies in collusion cases. In a jurisdiction relatively new to

36

Reports of cases decided or investigations by the competition authorities in China are often not
available. The information on the cases has been compiled from secondary sources. See infra app.
37
ANGELA H. ZHANG, CHINESE ANTITRUST EXCEPTIONALISM: HOW THE RISE OF CHINA
CHALLENGES GLOBAL REGULATION 94 (2011) [hereinafter ZHANG, ANTITRUST EXCEPTIONALISM].
38
Competition Ordinance, supra note 16, at 25–26, §§ 6–8; see also COMPETITION COMM’N,
GUIDELINE: THE FIRST CONDUCT RULE (2015) [hereinafter GUIDELINE: FIRST CONDUCT RULE],
https://www.compcomm.hk/en/legislation_guidance/guidance/first_conduct_rule/files/Guideline_The_
First_Conduct_Rule_Eng.pdf.
39
Competition Ordinance, supra note 16, div. 1.
40
GUIDELINE: FIRST CONDUCT RULE, supra note 38, at ¶ 4.3.
41
Competition Ordinance, supra note 16, at 113, § 135.
42
Competition Comm’n v. W. Hing Construction Co. Ltd., [2019] 3 H.K.C.T. 46 (H.K.)
[hereinafter Decoration Contractors]. Although the parties argued this “defense” to justify their
agreement, they failed.
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competition law, such as Hong Kong, there remains an open question as to
whether the law may in time move “away from standard best practice.”43
The HKCC acknowledges that the investigation of price-fixing
cartels is a priority for enforcement44 and this is supported by case law. In
its six years of operation, nine investigations were commenced by the
HKCC,45 eight of them concerning hard-core cartel agreements, involving
serious anti-competitive conduct. 46 In seven cases, price fixing was an
issue. 47 Only one case related to the prohibition on abuse of market power
(the so-called Second Conduct Rule).48 The HKCC has increasingly used
non-judicial enforcement tools, such as accepting commitments, to
conclude investigations that do not involve serious anti-competitive
conduct. As discussed further below,49 the high bar set for the burden of
proof to be met by the HKCC may explain the reluctance to start
proceedings before the HKCT in such cases.
2.

The different flavors of the prohibition of vertical
agreements

Because online platforms exercise control over user data, in the
digital economy algorithms and other technical means may facilitate
vertical anticompetitive agreements. In China, this concern is identified in
the Platform Economy Guidelines, but has not yet led to enforcement
action. In Hong Kong, the only example of enforcement in the digital sector
to date is Online Travel Agents concerning vertical agreements. In both
43

Ping Lin & Thomas W. Ross, Toward a More Robust Competition Policy Regime for Hong
Kong, 9 J. ANTITRUST ENF’T 109, 112, 120 (2021).
44
See Press Release, H.K. Competition Comm’n, Competition Commission Launches “Combat
Price Fixing Cartels” Campaign (Nov. 9, 2020), https://www.compcomm.hk/en/media/press/files/EN_
PR_CC_launches_Combat_Price_Fixing_Cartels_Campaign_20201109.pdf.
45
All cases in the HKCT and all judgments are published on the website of the HKCC. Cases in
the Competition Tribunal, H.K. COMPETITION COMM’N, www.compcomm.hk/en/enforcement/enforcement/competition_tribunal.html (last visited May 25, 2022).
46
As defined in the Competition Ordinance, supra note 16, §§ 2(1), 2(2).
47
Competition Comm’n v. Nutanix H. K. Ltd., [2017] H.K.C.T. 1 (H.K.); Competition Comm’n
v. W. Hing Construction Co. Ltd., [2020] H.K.C.T. 6 (H.K.); Competition Comm’n v. Kam Kwong
Eng’g Co. Ltd., [2020], H.K.C.T. 3 (H.K.); Competition Commission v. Fungs E&M En’g Co. Ltd.,
[2020], H.K.C.T 5 (H.K.); Competition Comm’n v. Quantr Ltd., [2020], H.K.C.T. 10 (H.K.);
Competition Comm’n v. T.H. Lee Book Co. Ltd., [2020], H.K.C.T. 12 (H.K.); Press Release, H.K.
Competition Comm’n, Notice Under Rule 19 of the Competition Tribunal Rules, Competition
Enforcement Action No. 1 of 2021 (Nov. 25, 2021), https://www.comptribunal.hk/filemanager/case/en/
upload/23/(Eng)%20Rule%2019%20notice%20(CTEA1-2021).pdf; Press Release, H.K. Competition
Comm’n, Competition Commission Takes Travel Services Sector Price-Fixing Cartel Case to
Competition Tribunal (Jan. 20, 2022), https://www.compcomm.hk/en/media/press/files/PR_Travel_Ser
vices_Sector_Cartel_EN.pdf.
48
Competition Comm’n v. Linde HKO Ltd., [2020] H.K.C.T. 2 (H.K.); see Press Release, H.K.
Competition Comm’n, Competition Commission Brings First Case on Abuse of Substantial Market
Power to Competition Tribunal (Dec. 21, 2020), https://www.compcomm.hk/en/media/press/files/EN_P
R_SCR_Final.pdf [hereinafter Competition Comm’n Press Release].
49
See infra Section III.A.
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jurisdictions, the focus of enforcement against anticompetitive vertical
agreements to date has been on retail price maintenance (“RPM”).
In China, Article 14 of the AML specifically prohibits “monopoly
agreements” between “business operators and their trading parties” that
“fix the price” for “resale to a third party.” Although this provision may
appear to outlaw RPM agreements, looking at Articles 13, 14 and 15
together, it seems that the AML establishes a “prohibition plus exemption”
regime for both anticompetitive horizontal and vertical agreements. These
are unlawful, unless an exemption applies under Article 15. However,
Chinese case law 50 suggests that RPM is subject to a prohibition rule,
making it unlawful irrespective of its impact on competition. 51 The
authorities often treat such agreements as if they were a form of price fixing
cartel. This is also the approach taken by the Supreme People’s Court of
China in the only appeal to date that was successful in the first instance
(and then reversed).52 As has been remarked,53 the adoption of a “bright
line approach” of per se illegality of RPM agreements is likely a side effect
of a new competition law regime.
Article 7(3) of the Platform Economy Guidelines identifies that
anticompetitive agreements can be reached by the use of technical means,
platform rules, data, and algorithms.54 Article 8 targets the possibility that
digital tools could facilitate the creation and maintenance of so called “huband-spoke agreements.” These agreements consist of vertically organized
collusion where the parties are not directly in contact but communicate
through a central intermediary (the hub) to align their commercial activity.
50

Investigations can be carried out under Articles 13 and 14 of the AML. For example, see the
cases against foreign car distributors. MELBOURNE L. SCH., CHINA COMPETITION BULLETIN
SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2014, 1–2 (Allan Fels et al. eds., 34th ed. 2014) (discussing the Hubei Car
Distribution Cartel), https://law.unimelb.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0006/1796478/China-Competiti
on-Bulletin-September-October-2014.pdf [hereinafter COMPETITION BULLETIN, SEPT./OCT. 2014];
MELBOURNE L. SCH., CHINA COMPETITION BULLETIN SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2015, 1, 6 (Allan Fels et al.
eds.,
38th
ed.
2014)
(discussing
the
Guandong
Nissan
Distributors
Cartel),
https://law.unimelb.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0009/1796445/China-Competition-Bulletin-Septembe
r-October-2015-3.pdf; see also HANNAH HA ET AL., China, in CARTELS: ENFORCEMENT, APPEALS &
DAMAGES ACTIONS 42 (Nigel Parr & Euan Burrows eds., 2d ed. 2014) (discussing the Infant Formula
Milk Cartel). The Infant Formula Milk Cartel case was an RPM case in which, very unusually, three
companies received total immunity, against the NDRC’s own guidelines.
51
On the difference between rules and standards, see PABLO IBÁÑEZ COLOMO, THE SHAPING OF
EU COMPETITION LAW: PAST AND PROSPECTS 23, 64–67 (2018) [hereinafter COLOMO, SHAPING OF EU
COMPETITION LAW].
52
See sources cited infra note 303. Interestingly, reforming the treatment of RPM towards an
effects-based approach is one amongst the most recent proposals to amend the AML. See Shìchǎng
jiānguǎn zǒngjú jiù <fǎn lǒngduàn fǎ> xiūdìng cǎo'àn (gōngkāi zhēngqiú yìjiàn gǎo) gōngkāi zhēngqiú
yìjiàn de gōnggào (市场监管总局就《<反垄断法>修订草案 （公开征求意见稿）》公开征求 意见
的公告) [Press Release, State Admin. for Mkt. Regul., Announcement of the State Administration for
Market Regulation on the Public Consultation on the “Anti-Monopoly Law” Amendment Draft (Jan. 2,
2020),
https://www.samr.gov.cn/hd/zjdc/202001/t20200102_310120.html
[hereinafter
AML
Amendment Proposal].
53
Colino, Distribution Agreements, supra note 17, at 34.
54
Platform Economy Guidelines, supra note 25, art. 7.
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It is possible that the SAMR may therefore concentrate on these two areas
in its future enforcement against anticompetitive vertical agreements in the
digital economy.
In Hong Kong, the HKCC investigated parity clauses in Online
Travel Agents. Parity clauses require suppliers using the platform of online
travel agents not to offer better terms on other platforms or to their own
costumers in. This case provides the only example of enforcement in the
online/digital sector in Hong Kong to date and was settled by the HKCC.
It will be considered below.55
The HKCC takes the view that vertical arrangements are generally
unlikely to be considered serious anti-competitive conduct. However, a
literal reading of Section 2(1) of the CO would not exclude this possibility
and, “in certain circumstances, Retail Price Maintenance may constitute an
instance of Serious Anti-Competitive Conduct.”56 Although theoretically
the imposition of RPM could be an abuse of dominance, the HKCC has
specified that RPM will always be investigated under the First Conduct
Rule. 57 This may reflect that vertical restraints are often reached by
agreement and requested by retailers to protect their investment.
In the Nutanix Bid Rigging judgment,58 the HKCT took a strict view
of a case where the anticompetitive conduct in question consisted of several
bilateral vertical agreements between an upstream supplier and
downstream resellers in an arrangement reminiscent of a “hub-and-spoke”
agreement. Unlike precedents from the European Union and the United
Kingdom, the HKCT did not consider whether the resellers were aware of
the arrangement, therefore making it possible to sanction a series of vertical
agreements with a “horizontal element” as a cartel.59
B.

Abuse of Dominance: China’s Big Tech Under the Spotlight

In both China and Hong Kong, the prohibition of abuse of a
dominant position is drafted in line with European (and Singaporean)
precedent. In China, firms that have a dominant position are required under
article 6 of the AML60 not to abuse it. Article 17 provides a list of practices
considered abusive, 61 including exclusive dealing. The recent abuse of
dominance cases against Big Tech with record fines levied against
55

See infra Section II.B.2.
The exclusion is found in the Competition Ordinance. See Competition Ordinance, supra note
16, sched. 1, § 5; see also GUIDELINE: FIRST CONDUCT RULE, supra note 38, at ¶¶ 5.5–5.6.
57
GUIDELINE: FIRST CONDUCT RULE, supra note 38, at ¶¶ 6.71–6.77.
58
Competition Commission v. Nutanix Hong Kong Ltd. [2019] HKCT 2 (Legal Reference
System).
59
See also Marcus Pollard & Kathleen Gooi, Work in Progress: Hong Kong’s Competition Law
Five Years On, 11 J. EUR. COMPETITION L. & PRAC. 372, 375–76 (2020).
60
China Anti-Monopoly Law, supra note 18, art. 6.
61
Id. art. 17.
56
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Alibaba62 and other platforms63 have stolen the limelight. These cases tend
to focus on anticompetitive practices of dominant marketplace platforms
that favor certain merchants over others. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the loss
of control over personal data,64 which is one of the most pressing concerns
against platforms throughout Europe, does not appear to be a concern in
China.
There has been very little enforcement of the prohibition on abuse
of a dominant position in Hong Kong. The need for the HKCC to meet the
criminal standard of proof (beyond reasonable doubt) for the imposition of
all pecuniary penalties in antitrust cases 65 may explain this cautious
approach.
The Second Conduct Rule 66 prohibits businesses with substantial
market power from abusing it. The Guideline issued by the Competition
Commission makes it clear that the notion of a “substantial degree of
market power” is interpreted in line with the notion of dominance in
European Union law.67 To date, only one proceeding has been brought to
the HKCT for a breach of the Second Conduct Rule. In Linde, 68 the
respondent, Linde HKO Limited, is alleged to have abused its position of
substantial market power in the market for the supply of medical gases in
Hong Kong during the Covid-19 pandemic. Linde is accused of engaging
in exclusionary practices against the only other potential competitor in the
supply to public hospitals. According to the HKCC, these practices
included unjustified denial of supply of medical gases, and the imposition
of unreasonable terms. This is the first case in Hong Kong where one of
the respondents, Linde Gmbh, was a non-Hong Kong-based business.
It may seem strange that the Anti-monopoly Enforcement
Authorities’ (AMEAs) investigations against Big Tech in China have not
yet resulted in parallel action in Hong Kong,69 but this may change soon.
In January 2022, the HKCC issued a press release asking the restaurant
industry to provide information about online food delivery platforms in
62

See supra Section I.B.1.
Such as Meituan (infra Section I.B.3) and Sherpa’s (infra Section I.B.2).
64
Bundeskartellamt Prohibits Facebook from Combining User Data from Different Sources,
BUNDESKARTELLAMT (Feb. 7, 2019), https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Meldung/EN/Press
emitteilungen/2019/07_02_2019_Facebook.html. (The Bundeskartellamt finding that Facebook had
engaged in ‘abusive data processing policy’).
65
See infra Section III.A.
66
Competition Ordinance, supra note 16, § 21.
67
COMPETITION COMM’N, GUIDELINE: THE SECOND CONDUCT RULE 15–24 (2015), https://www
.compcomm.hk/en/legislation_guidance/guidance/second_conduct_rule/files/Guideline_The_Second_
Conduct_Rule_Eng.pdf.
68
Competition Comm’n v. Linde HKO Ltd., [2021] 5 H.K.L.R.D. 175 (H.K.). At the time of
writing, the case is pending before the HKCT.
69
Apart from the desire to first concentrate resources on the most problematic forms of
anticompetitive activity, namely cartels, the HKCC faces objective difficulties in meeting the judicially
required burden of proof (the criminal standard, beyond reasonable doubt) for the imposition of pecuniary
penalties in an adversarial system of enforcement. See infra Section III.A.
63
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Hong Kong. This is part of an ongoing investigation into possible
anticompetitive conduct by Delivery Hero Food Hong Kong Limited
(trading as Foodpanda) and Deliveroo Hong Kong Limited (trading as
Deliveroo).70 Depending on the evidence collected, a positive judgment of
the HKCT in Linde could embolden the HKCC to prosecute these
platforms next.
Up until October 2020, there were no cases for abuse of dominance
against Big Tech in China. Through the end of June 2020, there had
reportedly been forty-eight investigations and the most frequently targeted
industries were: public utilities and active pharmaceutical ingredients
(API), followed by high tech and IP.71 At that time, although the SAMR
had “started to pay closer attention to the conduct of the major internet
giants,” it had not yet “officially penalized any internet platform
companies.” This was so, even though in 2019 the SAMR had issued its
“Interim Provisions on Prohibiting Abuse of Market Dominant Position”72
whose Article 11 mentioned factors to be considered in assessing “the
Internet and other new economic business operators.” In fact,
notwithstanding these pronouncements, for a period it appeared that the
SAMR would investigate the players in the digital economy under
regulations that pre-dated the adoption of the AML. On February 8, 2021
the SAMR reportedly73 fined Vipshop ¥3,000,000 under the Anti Unfair
Competition Law and Price Law (but not the AML) for imposing traffic
limits on sellers also active on other platforms (an early instance of the socalled “choose one from two” practice that was the main theory of harm in
the Alibaba decision considered below). 74 In an even earlier case on
December 30, 2020, the SAMR reportedly announced “in a social media
post” that it had issued fines of ¥500,000 for unspecified issues of
“irregular pricing” against Alibaba’s Tmall; Jingdong (Alibaba’s

70
Press Release, H.K. Competition Comm’n, Competition Commission Invites Restaurant
Industry to Provide Information in its Investigation into Online Food Delivery Platforms (Jan. 27, 2022),
https://www.compcomm.hk/en/media/press/files/PR_Online_Delivery_Platform_EN.pdf. The two
platforms under investigation are Delivery Hero Food Hong Kong (a/k/a Foodpanda) and Deliveroo
Hong Kong (a/k/a Deliveroo).
71
Chen Liu et al., Most Targeting Industries and Conduct in China’s Antitrust Investigations
against
Abuse
of
Dominance,
COMPETITION
POL’Y
INT’L
(July
30,
2020),
https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/most-targeted-industries-and-conduct-in-chinasantitrust-investigations-against-abuse-of-dominance/.
72
Interim Provisions on Prohibiting Abuse of Market Dominant Positions (promulgated by the
State Admin. for Mkt. Regul., June 26, 2019, effective Sept. 1, 2019) (Lawinfochina).
73
CLIFFORD CHANCE, ANTITRUST IN CHINA AND ACROSS THE REGION 5 (2021), https://www.
cliffordchance.com/content/dam/cliffordchance/briefings/2021/04/asia-pacific-quarterly-antitrustbriefing---q1-2021.pdf
74
See infra Section I.B.1.
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competitor) and Vipshop;75 this appears to be the first case when fines were
imposed on tech companies in China.
In February 2021, the SAMR published the Platform Economy
Guidelines,76 signaling a renewed focus on dominance and abuse in the
digital sector. Under these Guidelines, the “ability to master and process
relevant data” 77 is a factor to be considered when assessing market
dominance together with “ease of data acquisition,” one of a number of
barriers to entry or expansion. 78 The SAMR expressly considers that
platforms may constitute an essential facility 79 and that big data and
algorithms can aid price differentiation and other anticompetitive
differential treatment.80 Behaviors “that require operators on the platform
to “choose one from two” among competing platforms or restrict the
counterparty to the transaction to conduct exclusive transactions with
them” can constitute abuse of dominance.81 The SAMR recognizes that
punitive measures (“such as blocking stores, searching rights, traffic
restrictions, technical obstacles and deducting deposit”) are more serious
than seeking to incentivize users to choose only one platform. In the latter
case, the dominant player may seek to grant “subsidies, discounts,
preferential treatments, traffic resource support etc.” and this may have
positive effects on “the interests of operators and consumers on the
platform, and the overall welfare of society.”
In the Platform Economy Guidelines, the SAMR also lists a number
of “legitimate reasons” that the owners of dominant digital platforms may
have for restricting transactions.82 Judging from the cases below, however,
none of these reasons must have been applicable to the practices of Alibaba
Group, nor Meituan, nor a lesser-known platform, Sherpa’s, which
specializes in online food delivery to the expat communities in Shanghai,
Beijing, and Suzhou.
Three main points stand out from a review of these cases. First,
market definition and analysis are based on established methods of
assessment and well-understood theories of harm in exclusive dealing
75

Yilei Sun et al., China Fines JD.Com, Alibaba’s Tmall, Vipshop for Irregular Pricing, REUTERS
(Dec. 30, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-market-regulation-idUSKBN29413C. For
more details on the sanctioned behavior see Xu Wei, China Fines JD, Tmall, and Vipshop for Shady
Double-11 Shopping Event Promos, YICAI GLOB. (Dec. 31, 2020), https://www.yicaiglobal.com/news/
chinese-e-tailers-jdcom-tmall-vipshop-get-slapped-with-usd77000-each-for-shady-promos. However, it
is not possible to understand the legal basis for this fine from this article.
76
Platform Economy Guidelines, supra note 25.
77
Id. art. 11(3).
78
Id. art. 11(5).
79
Id. art. 14.
80
Id. art. 17(1).
81
Id. art. 15(1). The Chinese term for “choose one from two” is èr xuǎn yī (二选一).
82
Id. For example, see articles stating that operators in the platform economy may have legitimate
reasons for selling below cost (art. 13); refusing to trade (art. 14); restricting transactions (art. 15); tying
and bundling (art. 16).
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cases. Speed in decision-making can be partly attributed to the choice to
focus on a relatively clear market definition and on one single instance of
abuse. Second, the decisions do not include any consideration of possible
objective reasons that may justify the conduct, despite what the Platform
Economy Guidelines clearly state.83 This is a fundamental difference with
the legal test developed by the European Court of Justice and applied in
the European Union.84 Third, the parties waive their rights to appeal the
decision. They are eager to confirm their wish to comply with the findings
and rectify their behavior. This is a very specific trait of Chinese antitrust
enforcement, setting it apart not only from enforcement in mature systems
of competition law, but also from the practice of enforcement in Hong
Kong.
1.

Alibaba meets the SAMR

In April 2021, the SAMR imposed a fine of ¥18.23 billion 85
(approximately US $2.8 billion) against Alibaba Group Holdings Limited
for abuse of a dominant position. The decision was widely reported in the
global media,86 although the practice of “choose one from two” has been a
concern in Chinese antitrust since at least 2017.87 The notoriety of Alibaba
and the magnitude of the fine—more than double the previous highest fine
imposed under the AML in China—captured the public’s attention. It is
sobering to reflect, however, that the fine equates to only four percent of
Alibaba’s revenue in China in the previous year.88
83

Id.
Sandra Marco Colino makes a similar point in her article. See Colino, Incursion of Antitrust,
supra note 15, at 11–18.
85
Shìchǎng jiānguǎn zǒngjú yīfǎ duì ālǐ bābā jítuán kònggǔ yǒuxiàn gōngsī zài zhōngguó jìngnèi
wǎngluò língshòu píngtái fúwù shìchǎng shíshī"èr xuǎn yī"lǒngduàn xíngwéi zuòchū xíngzhèng chǔfá
(市场监管总局依法对阿里巴巴集团控股有限公司在中国境内网络零售平台服务市场实施"二
选一"垄断行为作出行政处罚) [Press Release, State Admin. for Mkt. Regul., The State Administration
for Market Regulation Imposes Sanctions on Alibaba’s “Choose One From Two” Policy in the Online
Retail Platform Service Market in China in Accordance with the Law] (Apr. 10, 2021), http://www.samr.
gov.cn/xw/zj/202104/t20210410_327702.html [hereinafter SAMR Press Release]. The press release
includes two documents: a “Penalty Notice” and an “Administrative Instructions” document.
86
See, e.g., Raymond Zhong, China Fines Alibaba $2.8 Billion in Landmark Antitrust Case, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 9, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/09/technology/china-alibaba-monopolyfine.html; Ryan McMorrow & Yuan Yang, Chinese Regulators Fine Alibaba Record $2.8bn, FIN. TIMES
(Apr. 10, 2021), https://www.ft.com/content/bb251dcc-4bff-4883-9d81-061114fee87f.
87
A March 2021 article reported that this practice has triggered at least eight antitrust and unfair
competition investigations in the platform economy since 2017. See Wei Huang et al., Antitrust
Guidelines for the Platform Economy in the Era of Enhanced Antitrust Scrutiny, CPI
ANTITRUST CHRON. (Mar. 29, 2021), https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/wp-content/
uploads/2021/03/10-Antitrust-Guidelines-for-the-Platform-Economy-in-the-Era-of-Enhanced-Antitrust
-Scrutiny-By-Wei-Huang-Wendy-Zhou-Xiumin-Ruan-Xi-Zhang.pdf.
88
Scott Murdoch & David Stanway, China Fines Alibaba Record $2.75 Bln for Anti-Monopoly
Violations, REUTERS (Apr. 9, 2022), https://www.reuters.com/business/retail-consumer/chinaregulators-fine-alibaba-275-bln-anti-monopoly-violations-2021-04-10/.
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Because of its importance, it is worth considering the Alibaba
decision in detail.89 First, substantively, the SAMR applies the law against
abuse of a dominant position in the AML and in the Platform Economy
Guidelines. The SAMR found that Alibaba held a dominant position in the
market for online retail platform services in China. The market was defined
by looking at supply-side and demand-side substitutability, but without
recourse to application of the small but significant non-transitory increase
in price (SSNIP) test. 90 From 2015 to 2019 Alibaba held an eighty-six
percent share of this market by total sales value and a seventy-six percent
share of total revenues. The market appeared to be extremely concentrated
and characterized by imbalance in the power of Alibaba as compared to the
weak position of the sellers using the platform.
Alibaba was found to have abused its dominant position through the
imposition of restrictions on merchants seeking to use platforms other than
Alibaba’s platforms. Broadly, the abuse therefore consists of seeking to
impose restrictive dealings by implementing sophisticated penalty
measures on firms that do not comply with the exclusivity requirement.
Exclusivity obligations in the absence of objective justification are
presumed illegal in many jurisdictions around the world.91 It is interesting,
however, that there is no mention in the Alibaba decision of the possible
role of objective justifications.
Second, the decision is published in two documents attached to a
press release: a Penalty Notice comprising twenty-seven pages of analysis
and leading to the order to stop the illegal acts and pay the fine, and an
Administrative Instruction Document providing details of the actions that
Alibaba is expected to undertake in order to comply with the order. Under
the Administrative Instruction Document, Alibaba must draw up a
rectification plan and submit annual compliance reports for the next three
years. Contrary to the practice of other authorities—namely the European
Commission—the SAMR chose to focus on the role of Alibaba as a
marketplace and on one type of abuse only, namely “choose one from two.”
As noted,92 this is in sharp contrasts with other cases, such as the Amazon

89

For an in-depth review of the Alibaba decision, see Sandra Marco Colino, The Case Against
Alibaba in China: Merits and Wider Policy Repercussions, 10 J. ANTITRUST ENF’T 217 (2022)
[hereinafter Colino, Case Against Alibaba].
90
See SAMR Press Release, supra note 85; see also Colino, Case Against Alibaba, supra note 89,
at 222.
91
In the European Union, see Case T-85/76, Hoffman-La Roche & Co. v. Comm’n, 1979 E.C.R.
464 (landmark case on exclusivity rebates). More recently, exclusive dealings were considered by the
Court of Justice of the European Union in Intel Corp. Inc. v. European Commission. See Case C-413/14,
Intel Corp. Inc. v. Comm’n, 2017 ECLI:EU:C:2017:632 (Sept. 6, 2017). The Court remitted the case to
the General Court. See Case T-286/09, Intel v. Comm’n, ECLI:EU:T:2014:547 (June 12, 2014). The
judgment was issued on January 26, 2022. The Court quashed the Commission decision.
92
Colino, Case Against Alibaba, supra note 89, at 220–23.
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Marketplace case under the European Commission, 93 where the
investigation focused on the dual role of Amazon as both the provider of
the marketplace platform and a retailer on the very same platform. The
narrow focus of the Chinese case may explain the relatively short length of
the investigation and the short decision. It could also provide a valuable
template for other authorities in cases where speed is of the essence. At the
same time, such an approach raises questions as to whether the imposed
penalties and remedies will be sufficient to address the underlying concerns
for the competitiveness of the online marketplace. This aspect is
considered further below.94
Third, procedurally, in the Penalty Notice, “the parties waived the
right to make statements, defenses and to request a hearing.” From a
Western perspective, this is a startling admission. The companies that are
subject to a large fine in countries of mature enforcement of the
competition laws tend to appeal the decisions through different grades of
appeal.95 Not so in China. The reasons for this are complex and will be
considered below, 96 but the ready acceptance of the findings may also
explain the short length of the decisions. Knowing there will be no appeal,
the authorities do not need to prove their case to the same extent.
Finally, the decision was reached with incredible speed by Western
standards. It took only three months to close the investigation, leading
some commentators to praise the decision, and characterize it as
“thoughtful and impressive.” 97 While one can sympathize with the
frustration generated by the length of time that antitrust investigations can
take in Western countries, it is important to consider it in its context. This
will be considered further below.98
2.

The Sherpa’s decision: smaller platforms are not safe

Also in April 2021, one of the AMEAs, the Shanghai Administration
for Market Regulation (Shanghai AMR), announced that in December

93

European Commission Press Release IP/20/2077, Antitrust: Commission Sends Statement of
Objections to Amazon for the Use of Non-Public Independent Seller Data and Opens Second
Investigation into its E-Commerce Business Practices (Nov. 10, 2020).
94
See infra Section IV.B.
95
For example, according to its 2020 Annual Report, the General Court of the European Union
(the court of first instance) completed forty-one state aid and competition cases. Seventy-eight
competition cases were still pending at the end of 2020. One-hundred and four state aid and competition
cases were pending on appeal before the Court of Justice at the end of 2020. See CT. OF JUST. OF THE
EUR. UNION, THE YEAR IN REVIEW: ANNUAL REPORT 2020, 58, 61 (2021), https://curia.europa.eu/jcm
s/upload/docs/application/pdf/2021-04/ra_pan_2020_en.pdf.
96
See infra Section III.B.
97
See CLIFFORD CHANCE, supra note 73, at 7.
98
See infra Section IV.
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2020 it fined Sherpa’s,99 an online food delivery platform, for abuse of
dominance in violation of Article 13 of the AML. The investigation lasted
eighteen months, concluding in December 2020. The publication of the
decision coincides with publication of the Alibaba decision.
In a document comprising seventeen pages, the Shanghai AMR
applied the SSNIP test and found that the relevant market was the market
for online food delivery through apps in the English language. This is
because there is limited substitutability with Chinese language apps for
non-Chinese speakers. In this market, the Shanghai AMR identified four
competitors and found that Sherpa’s share accounted for half the total of
the relevant market. The Shanghai AMR quoted Article 19(1) of the AML
for its finding that such a level of market share supports a finding of
dominance.100 Other factors considered were that Sherpa’s was in a better
financial position than its competitors and possessed better technical
capabilities and scale. Similar to Alibaba, the investigation was narrow in
scope. Sherpa’s was found to have imposed an exclusivity deal between
2017 and 2019, requiring all catering businesses using the platform to be
using Sherpa’s platform exclusively.101 Sherpa’s was fined ¥1.17 million
(approx. US $180,000) equivalent to three percent of the company’s
turnover in 2018. Like Alibaba (and Meituan, see below), Sherpa’s
“sincerely accepted the penalty, proactively cooperated with the authority's
investigation, and took the initiative to rectify its work and completed
rectification in November 2019.”102
3.

Meituan: the Alibaba Blueprint

Later in the same year, in October 2021,103 the SAMR fined the food
delivery platform Meituan in a decision that follows the blueprint of the
Alibaba decision.
First, the SAMR substantively applied the law against abuse of a
dominant position in the AML and in the Platform Economy Guidelines.
The SAMR found that Meituan held a dominant position in the market for
99
Aiping Bao, SAMR Imposed Record Fine on Alibaba for Abuse of Dominant Position, CMS
(Apr. 15, 2021), https://cms.law/en/chn/publication/samr-imposed-record-fine-on-alibaba-for-abuse-ofdominant-position.
100
China Anti-Monopoly Law, supra note 18, art. 19 (“[T]he conclusion that an undertaking holds
a dominant position can be deduced from any of the following circumstances: (1) the market share of
one undertaking accounts for half the total in a relevant market”).
101
Hu
Min,
Sherpa’s
Hit
with
1.17m
Yuan
Fine,
SHANGHAIDAILY.COM
(Apr. 13, 2021), https://archive.shine.cn/metro/Sherpas-hit-with-117m-yuan-fine/shdaily.shtml.
102
Sherpa’s Fined $178,351 for Monopoly Behaviors in China in 2020, GLOB. TIMES (Apr. 12,
2021), https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202104/1220821.shtml.
103
Guójiā shìchǎng jiāndū guǎnlǐ zǒngjú xíngzhèng chǔfá juédìng shū guó shì jiān chǔfá
(国家市场监督管理总局 ⾏政处罚决定书 国市监处罚〔2021〕74 号) [State Administration for
Market Regulation on Administrative Penalty Decision] (promulgated by the State Admin. for Mkt.
Regul., Oct. 8, 2021), https://www.samr.gov.cn/xw/zj/202110/t20211008_335364.html.
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online retail platform services in China. As in Alibaba, the market was
defined by looking at factors for supply-side and demand-side
substitutability, without recourse to the SSNIP test. In a market extremely
concentrated and characterized by imbalance in the power of Meituan as
compared to the weak position of the platform users, Meituan’s share in
the years 2018 to 2020 exceeded sixty percent, by revenue and by volume,
and increased year-on-year.104
Similar to Alibaba, the SAMR focused narrowly on Meituan’s
abusive conduct through the imposition of exclusivity by way of
restrictions on merchants seeking to use competitors’ platforms (“choose
one from two” policy). Users that did not agree were required to pay higher
commissions and were penalized in the rankings and publicity of their
services. Meituan had the ability to monitor the merchants’ compliance
with the requirements and used algorithms to secure loyalty. Like in
Alibaba, there is no mention of any objective justification that could have
excused the practice.
Second, like Alibaba, Meituan is published in two documents
attached to a press release: a Penalty Notice comprising twenty-five pages
of analysis and leading to the order to stop the illegal acts and pay the fine,
and an Administrative Instruction Document which is four pages long and
provides details of the actions that Meituan is expected to undertake in
order to comply with the order: Meituan must draw up a rectification plan
to improve the platform’s “charging mechanism and algorithm rules,” and
submit annual compliance reports for the next three years. In light of the
special circumstances of the company, Meituan is also required to consider
the interests of the users of the platform and to improve the working
conditions of the riders.
Third, like in Alibaba, in the Penalty Notice “the parties waived the
right to make statements, defenses and to request a hearing.”105 Meituan
shows that the paragraph in Alibaba was not a one-off, perhaps attributable
to the personal situation of its founder, Jack Ma.106 Indeed, Sherpa’s issued
a similar statement, as seen above. As did Huya Inc. and Douyu
International in accepting the decision to block their merger in two
identical press releases.107
Finally, the decision was reached with similar, if not equal, speed as
Alibaba: the investigation was opened in April 2021 (following Alibaba)
and the decision issued six months later in October 2021.108 Again, the
104

By revenue, Meituan’s share was 67.3 percent in 2018, and increased to 69.5 percent in 2019,
and then to 70.7 percent in 2020. By volume of takeaway orders in China, Meituan’s share increased
from 62.4 percent in 2018, to 64.3 percent in 2019, and was calculated as 68.5 percent in 2020. Id. at 9.
105
Id. at 2.
106
See infra Section III.B; see also infra note 298.
107
See infra Section I.C; see also sources cited infra note 134.
108
See CLIFFORD CHANCE, supra note 73.
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short length of the decision, and the speed of reaching it, can be explained
by the narrow focus of the investigation. The speed of decision-making in
China will be considered further below.109
C.

Merger Control Comes of Age in China but Remains in
Infancy in Hong Kong

The other main area of enforcement against Big Tech in China after
abuse of a dominant position is merger control. This is not the case in Hong
Kong where, due to the legal position, the merger rules do not apply to the
digital sector.
In Hong Kong, the CO includes a prohibition of mergers that
substantially lessen competition or that are likely to do so (“Merger
Rule”). 110 Although the Merger Rule is drafted in general terms, for
historical reasons it only applies to mergers in the telecommunications
sector where one of the parties is a telecommunications carrier licensee.111
Given this, the main authority that will consider mergers in Hong Kong is
the Communications Authority, which has concurrent jurisdiction in
competition law matters with the HKCC.112 The rationale to subject the
telecommunications industry to more intrusive merger scrutiny than other
sectors dates back to the days when communications were entirely reliant
on traditional networks. There remain sound reasons to subject
telecommunications acquisitions to merger control, but it is difficult to
think of a rationale for exempting all other sectors, including Big Tech
platforms offering voice and data communications services.
The authorities in Hong Kong are also specifically barred from
assessing the compatibility of merger agreements with the First or the
Second Conduct Rule:113 the HKCC takes the view114 that any ancillary
restrictions to mergers (such as non-compete clauses) are also excluded
from review when they are directly related and necessary to the
implementation of the merger.115

109

See infra Section IV.A.
Competition Ordinance, supra note 16, sched. 7, § 3.
111
The Merger Rule in the CO is substantially similar to the relevant provision of the
Telecommunication Ordinance, (1963) Cap. 106, § 7P(1) (H.K.) (repealed 2012).
112
See Memorandum of Understanding between the Competition Comm’n and the Comm.
Authority 3, ¶ 1.2 (Dec. 14, 2015), https://www.compcomm.hk/en/about/inter_agency/files/MoU_e_fin
al_signed.pdf.
113
Competition Ordinance, supra note 16, sched. 1, § 4.
114
COMPETITION COMM’N, GUIDELINE: THE MERGER RULE 9, ¶¶ 2.18–2.19 (2015), https://www.
compcomm.hk/en/legislation_guidance/guidance/merger_rule/files/Guideline_The_Merger_Rule_Eng.
pdf.
115
See also Stephen Crosswell et al., The Merger Control Review: Hong Kong, THE LAW REVS.
(Aug. 1, 2021), https://thelawreviews.co.uk/title/the-merger-control-review/hong-kong.
110
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This blanket exclusion has a number of consequences which are very
well understood by the HKCC, 116 as shown by hopeful statements by
senior officials that it was not a matter of whether they will have merger
review powers—it was a matter of when.117 First, other jurisdictions may
have more of a say on mergers that affect consumers in Hong Kong than
the Hong Kong authorities themselves. For example, when Cathay Pacific
acquired Hong Kong Express Airways in 2019, the transaction was
reviewed and approved by the Taiwan Fair Trade Commission118 for the
competition aspects affecting Taiwanese passengers but could not be
assessed for its effect on the relevant markets in Hong Kong. Moreover,
the phenomenon of so-called “killer acquisitions” in some sectors, 119
including Big Tech,120 cannot be effectively policed. Killer acquisitions
are said to occur when an established business acquires promising start-ups
or nascent competitors with a view to delay or suppress the
commercialization of new products.121
Not so in China. Article 19 of the Platform Economy Guidelines
specifically clarifies that mergers that do not meet the thresholds for
notification can be proactively investigated by the SAMR and allows for
the merging parties to notify mergers voluntarily when these do not meet
the thresholds. The Q&A122 accompanying the publication of the Platform
Economy Guidelines suggests that the authority had killer acquisitions
very much in mind: “the field of (the) platform economy may be more

116

Although in 2019 there were indications suggesting that the Merger Rule could be made
operational for all sectors, this has not yet materialized. See Kanis Leung, Tightening of Hong Kong’s
Competition Laws to Cover Mergers on the Horizon, Says Competition Commission Chairwoman, S.
CHINA MORNING POST (Jan. 17, 2019), https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/hong-kong-economy/
article/2182425/tightening-hong-kongs-competition-laws-cover.
117
Comment attributed to Rasul Butt, then senior executive director of the HKCC and currently
chief executive officer, during an online event in April 2021. See also Crosswell et al., supra note 115;
Lin & Ross, supra note 43, at 125.
118
Andrew Curran, HK Express Acquisition Completed by Cathay Pacific, SIMPLE FLYING (July
22, 2019), https://simpleflying.com/cathay-pacific-hk-express/.
119
Notably, in the pharmaceutical sector. See Colleen Cunningham et al., Killer Acquisitions, 129
J. POL. ECON. 649 (2021).
120
The existence of killer acquisitions in Big Tech is currently subject to review by the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) in the United States. See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC to Examine
Past Acquisitions by Large Technology Companies (Feb. 11, 2020), https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/news/press-releases/2020/02/ftc-examine-past-acquisitions-large-technology-companies.
121
On the concept and the definition of killer acquisitions, see ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. AND DEV.,
START-UPS, KILLER ACQUISITIONS AND MERGER CONTROL (2020).
122
Guówùyuàn fǎn lǒngduàn wěiyuánhuì bàngōngshì fùzé tóngzhì jiù “guówùyuàn fǎn lǒngduàn
wěiyuánhuì guānyú píngtái jīngjì lǐngyù de fǎn lǒngduàn zhǐnán” dá jìzhě wèn (国务院反垄断委员会
办公室负责同志就《国务院反垄断委员会关于平台经济领域的反垄断指南》答记者问) [Press
Release, State Admin. for Mkt. Regul., The Responsible Comrade of the Off. of the Anti-Monopoly
Comm’n of the State Council Answered Reporters’ Questions on the Anti-Monopoly Guidelines of the
Anti-Monopoly Comm’n of the State Council on the Platform Economy] (Feb. 7, 2021),
http://gkml.samr.gov.cn/nsjg/xwxcs/202102/t20210207_325971.html.
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prone to this situation due to the characteristic of new business formats and
new models, or involving start-ups, emerging platforms, etc.”123
Acquisitions by Chinese tech companies have become a concern of
the authorities more generally. In China, mergers that meet certain
requirements need to be notified to the SAMR. 124 Similar to European
precedent (and unlike in Singapore, or in Hong Kong, for the limited
application of the Merger Rule), merger notification is mandatory, and the
parties cannot by law complete a transaction before clearance. 125 On
October 20, 2020, the SAMR issued its Interim Provisions on the Review of
Concentration of Business Operators,126 which came into force in December
2020 and consolidated six prior regulations issued by different authorities on
merger filings. These constitute the main guidelines, but there are also different
Guidance Opinions issued by the SAMR on mergers.127
If access to and ownership of data can be a factor in assessing
dominance, in merger control, data can be a factor in assessing the
competitive impact of a concentration. The ability to “master and process
data” and to control data interfaces, whether one of the parties can control
data interfaces, and the existence of exclusive rights are all important
factors. 128 It is also noteworthy that the Platform Economy Guidelines
specifically highlight that data can form part of a remedy package imposed
to assuage concerns about the anticompetitive effects of mergers. Possible
remedies include the divestiture of tangible assets, such as data, 129 and
“behavioral conditions such as opening up network, data or platform
infrastructure,” “terminating exclusive agreements, modifying platform
rules or algorithms, promising compatibility or not reducing
interoperability.”130
The adoption of the Platform Economy Guidelines has already been
felt by the sector. First, mergers have been abandoned. For example, the
parties did not proceed with the proposed acquisition of a controlling stake
in iQIYI, a video platform owned by Baidu, in which reportedly both

123

Id.
China Anti-Monopoly Law, supra note 18, art. 5, ch. IV.
125
Id. art. 21.
126
Jīngyíng zhě jízhōng shěnchá zhàn háng guiding ( 经营者 集中 审查暂 行规 定) [Interim
Provisions on the Review of Concentrations of Business Operators] (promulgated by the State Admin.
for Mkt. Regul., Oct. 23, 2020, effective Oct. 27, 2020), https://web.archive.org/web/20210117021941/
http://gkml.samr.gov.cn/nsjg/fgs/202010/t20201027_322664.html.
127
See Wei Yingling & Gong Minfang, Merger Control in China: Overview, Practical Law Q&A,
THOMPSON REUTERS (2021), https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/5-500-8611?transitionType=
Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&firstPage=true#co_anchor_a803926.
128
Platform Economy Guidelines, supra note 25, art. 20.
129
Id. art. 21(1).
130
Id. art. 21(2).
124
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Alibaba and Tencent were interested,131 citing the tightening of the rules as
a reason. Second, the authority has blocked mergers. The notified proposed
merger between Huya Inc. and Douyu International, two online game
streaming platforms backed by Tencent that collectively control more than
eighty percent of China’s online game streaming market,132 was blocked in
July 2021. This was only the third merger ever to be blocked in China.133
In statements reminiscent of the waivers of all rights to appeal in Alibaba
and Meituan, both Huya Inc. and Douyu International accepted the
decision in two identical press releases that they issued.134
Second, the SAMR has stepped up enforcement against parties for
non-reporting mergers. Under the AML, the maximum sanction that can
be imposed for non-notification currently is ¥500,000. In July 2021, it was
reported that Tencent would be fined the maximum amount for failing to
notify the acquisition of two apps, Kuwo and Kugou.135 Overall, it has been
reported that in 2021 the competition authorities in China imposed almost
one-hundred fines of the maximum amount on companies that failed to
report a notifiable transaction or completed a merger prior to obtaining
clearance.136 In November 2021, forty-three penalties were announced in a
single day.137 The companies sanctioned include Tencent, Alibaba, Baidu,
Didi, and Meituan. The sheer number of fines suggests that, prior to 2021,
merging parties were not too concerned about not notifying transactions.
The increase in enforcement action shows that merger control is
properly coming of age in China. Sanctions are an essential part of a wellfunctioning system of antitrust enforcement and deterrence.
131

Julie Zhu et al., Exclusive: Alibaba, Tencent Put Talks to Buy iQIYI Stake on Hold Due to Price,
Regulatory Concerns—Sources, REUTERS (Nov. 27, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-baidu-ma-iqiyi-exclusive-idUSKBN2870SI.
132
Shìchǎng jiānguǎn zǒngjú guānyú jìnzhǐ hǔyá gōngsī yǔ dòu yú guójì kònggǔ yǒuxiàn gōngsī
hébìng àn fǎn lǒngduàn shěnchá juédìng de gōnggào (市场监管总局关于禁止虎牙公司与斗鱼国际控
股 有 限 公 司 合 并 案 反 垄 断 审 查 决 定 的 公 告 ) [Press Release, State Admin. for Mkt. Regul.,
Announcement of the State Admin. for Mkt. Regul. on the Anti-Monopoly Review Decision on
Prohibiting the Merger between Huya Co. and DouYu International Holdings Co., Ltd.] (July 10, 2021),
http://www.samr.gov.cn/fldj/tzgg/ftjpz/202107/t20210708_332421.html.
133
See Colino, Incursion of Antitrust, supra note 15, at n.83.
134
Each company “fully respects and will abide by the SAMR Decision, and will comply with all
regulatory requirements, conduct its businesses in accordance with the applicable laws and regulations,
and fulfill its social responsibilities.” DouYu Announces Termination of Merger Agreement with Huya,
PR NEWSWIRE (July 12, 2021), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/douyu-announcestermination-of-merger-agreement-with-huya-301331404.html; HUYA Inc. Announces Termination of
Merger Agreement with DouYu, PR NEWSWIRE (July 12, 2021), https://www.prnewswire.com/newsreleases/huya-inc-announces-termination-of-merger-agreement-with-douyu-301331407.html.
135
Pei Li, EXCLUSIVE China to Order Tencent Music to Give Up Music Label Exclusivity—
Sources, REUTERS (July 12, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/world/china/exclusive-china-order-tencentmusic-give-up-music-label-exclusivity-sources-2021-07-12/.
136
See GIBSON DUNN, ANTITRUST IN CHINA: 2021 YEAR IN REVIEW 5, § 2.3 (2021)
137
China Fines Tech Giants for Failing to Report 43 Old Deals, REUTERS (Nov. 19, 2021),
https://www.reuters.com/technology/china-finds-43-anti-trust-law-violations-involving-alibaba-baidujdcom-2021-11-20/.
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Sanctions: The Missing Ingredient?

Due to a combination of legal provisions and practices by the
competition authorities, the level of fines imposed for breaches of
competition law by the authorities in China and in Hong Kong appears to
be relatively low. In absolute terms, the fines imposed in Alibaba and
Meituan in China appear to be astronomical, but they amount to “only”
four percent of Alibaba’s turnover in the preceding year 138 and three
percent of Meituan’s turnover. 139 Given the importance of sanctions to
ensure the deterrent effect of antitrust laws, relatively low fines have the
character of a “missing ingredient” for effective enforcement.
As a preliminary point, and as explained in more detail below, the
fines imposed are set with reference to the parties’ turnover (defined as
“the total gross revenue” of a firm “obtained in Hong Kong.”)140 in Hong
Kong and to the parties’ amount of sales (or revenue) in China. The two
concepts differ in accounting terms, as it is possible to conceive of turnover
(such as inventory turnover) that does not produce revenue, and of revenue
(such as reimbursements) that does not depend on turnover of goods or
services.141 In the context of competition law, where pecuniary sanctions
are related directly to the value of sales of the businesses in question, the
concepts of relevant turnover and revenue can be used interchangeably.142
In Hong Kong, the HKCT can impose fines of up to ten percent of
the business’s turnover obtained in Hong Kong for each year of
infringement up to a maximum of three years.143 It can also order payment
of the costs of the HKCC’s investigation and disqualify directors for up to
five years.144
As has been remarked,145 this is a low level of fines, for two reasons:
because there is a limit on the number of years considered (unlike, say, in
the United States and in Canada) and because the turnover considered is
limited to Hong Kong (unlike the case of other systems, such as the
European Union's system that considers the turnover on a global scale).
The HKCC published a Policy on Recommended Pecuniary Penalties in
138

See Murdoch & Stanway, supra note 88.
Li Xuanmin & Yin Yeping, China Fines Meituan $533m for Monopolist Practices, Milder than
Alibaba Due to Difference in Rectification Moves, GLOB. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2021),
https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202110/1235798.shtml.
140
Competition Ordinance, supra note 16, § 93(4).
141
For a primer about the difference between revenue and turnover, see Turnover vs Revenue: Do
They Mean the Same Thing?, REVOLUT (July 6, 2020), https://blog.revolut.com/a/turnover-vs-revenue/.
142
Yannis Katsoulacos et al., Penalizing Cartels—A Spectrum of Regimes, 7 J. ANTITRUST ENF’T
339, 342 (2019).
143
When the contravention spanned more than three years, the fine is based on the three years when
the business achieved “the highest, second highest and third highest turnover.” Competition Ordinance,
supra note 16, § 93.
144
Id. § 101.
145
Lin & Ross, supra note 43, at 117–18.
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June 2020, 146 adopting the methodology indicated by the HKCT in
Competition Commission v. W Hing Construction Company.147 To date, all
fines imposed concerned cartels.
In China, under Article 46(1) of the AML, the authority “shall order”
the undertaking to: 1) stop the illegal act, 2) confiscate the illegal gains,
and 3) pay a fine up to ten percent of its sales in the preceding year. The
text of Article 46 suggests that the three should be adopted in parallel (so
that the infringers should be ordered to stop the illegal act and pay a fine
and return the illegal gains they made, thereby increasing the deterrent
effect of the fines). However, due to lack of clear guidance and
administrative convenience (as it can be difficult to determine what
constitutes an illegal gain), illegal gains were confiscated only in about
thirty percent of cases decided between January 2015 and June 2020,
whereas a fine was imposed in more than sixty percent of cases.148 When
determining the amount of a fine, authorities must consider factors such as
the nature, seriousness, and duration of the illegal acts.149 Based on the
information available, it seems that the SAMR has never imposed the
maximum possible fine of ten percent of turnover in the relevant year in
the cases considered.
As seen above,150 the fines in Alibaba and Meituan amount to “only”
four percent and three percent of the companies’ turnover in the previous
year, respectively. The fines for cartels may also appear noticeably high in
absolute terms (especially against international cartelists), but not in
percentage terms. For instance, in 12 Japanese Auto Parts Cartel, 151
Sumitomo received one of the highest fines imposed for cartels in China in
absolute terms, at ¥290.4 million (approximately US $148 million), and
this equated to six percent of relevant revenue. Among the cases
reviewed, 152 only one company was fined nine percent of its relevant

146
COMPETITION COMM’N, POLICY ON RECOMMENDED PECUNIARY PENALTIES (2020), https://
www.compcomm.hk/en/legislation_guidance/policy_doc/files/Policy_on_Recommended_Pecuniary_P
enalties_Eng.pdf.
147
Competition Comm’n v. W. Hing Construction Co. Ltd., [2019] 3 H.K.L.R.D. 46 (H.K.).
148
Josh Yi Xue, et al., Confiscating Illegal Gains in Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement
Practice, ZHONG LAW FIRM 2 (2020), http://www.zhonglun.com/upfile/file/20200820_Confiscating%2
0Illegal%20Gains%20in%20Chinese%20Anti-monopoly%20Law%20Enforcement%20Practice_en_cl
ean.pdf.
149
China Anti-Monopoly Law, supra note 18, art. 49,
150
See Murdoch & Stanway, supra note 88; see also Xuanmin & Yeping, supra note 139.
151
See Michael Gu, NDRC Imposes Record Fines on 12 Japanese Auto Parts and Bearing
Manufacturers, LEXOLOGY (Sept. 25, 2014), https://www.lexology.com/commentary/competitionantitrust/china/anjie-law-firm/ndrc-imposes-record-fines-on-12-japanese-auto-parts-and-bearingmanufacturers; MELBOURNE L. SCH., CHINA COMPETITION BULLETIN JULY/AUGUST 2014, 2 (Allan Fels
et al. eds., 33d ed. 2014).
152
See cases cited infra app.
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revenue in a cartel case (EUKOR Car Carriers in the Roll-On/Roll-Off
Services Cartel).153
In some cases, the fine that can be imposed under the AML is legally
capped. For example, the maximum fine to be levied against industry
associations is ¥500,000 (approximately US $79,000), although in serious
cases the trade association can also be de-registered. As seen above,154 the
fine for non-notification of a merger is also currently subject to a ¥500,000
cap.
However, proposals to amend the AML are afoot. Proposals were
first published by the SAMR for consultation on January 2, 2020,155 and
this was followed by a second round of proposals by the Standing
Committee of China’s National People’s Congress published on October
23, 2021 156 (together, the AML Amendment Proposals). A number of
important changes to the AML could result in substantive changes on
RPM, cartels, and mergers. Specifically on sanctions, the AML
Amendment Proposals envisage increased penalties for breaches by trade
associations, 157 against businesses and individuals for obstruction of
investigations,158 and in merger control (for failure to notify and for breach
of remedies).159 For the first time, the AML Amendment Proposals also
appear to allow for the possibility of criminal liability for breaches of
competition law, stating that criminal liability may arise where the
violation constitutes a crime.160 The digital economy features prominently
in the second round of amendments published: abusing data and algorithms
are specifically mentioned as an area of focus alongside new regulation.161
153

See Michael Gu & Sihui Sun, NDRC Rules in First International Shipping Company Monopoly
Case, LEXOLOGY (Aug. 4, 2016), https://www.lexology.com/commentary/competition-antitrust/china/a
njie-law-firm/ndrc-rules-in-first-international-shipping-company-monopoly-case.
154
See supra Section I.C.
155
See AML Amendment Proposal, supra note 52.
156
Zhōnghuá rénmín gònghéguó fǎn lǒngduàn fǎ xiūdìng cǎo'àn (gōngkāi zhēngqiú yìjiàn gǎo)
(中华人民共和国反垄断法修订草案(公开征求意见稿)) [Draft Amendment to the Anti-Monopoly
Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 25, 2021) [hereinafter AML
Amendment Proposal].
157
From the current upper limit of ¥500,000 to an upper limit of ¥5,000,000 (approximately
$789,000).
158
The proposal is for fines for obstructions for individuals to increase from the current upper limit
of ¥100,000 to ¥1,000,000. For businesses, from ¥1,000,000 to up to one percent of turnover in the last
year (or ¥5,000,000 if the business did not generate revenues in the past year).
159
From the current upper limit of ¥500,000 to a fine of up to ten percent of the turnover of the
business concerned for the preceding year.
160
AML Amendment Proposal, supra note 156, art. 21.
161
It appears that the authorities intend for competition law and regulation to work hand in hand in
monitoring the use of algorithms. New sweeping algorithm regulations came into force in China in March
2022. Two main regulatory requirements apply, namely operational transparency and user control over
the data that can be fed to the algorithms. In addition, the regulations mandate that algorithm operators
follow an ethical code for cultivating “positive energy” online and preventing the spread of undesirable
or illegal information. See Rogier Creemers, Graham Webster, & Hellen Toner, Translation: Internet
Information Service Algorithmic Recommendation Management Provisions—Effective March 1, 2022,
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TOOLS
FOR
DETECTION
AND
ENFORCEMENT:
SETTLEMENTS AND PRIVATE ACTIONS; LENIENCY AND
WHISTLEBLOWING.

Authorities have a number of tools for detection and enforcement of
the competition rules. Comparing the positions of Hong Kong to those in
China, it appears that tools of enforcement in Hong Kong are less
comprehensive than the equivalent tools in China. This holds true for
government enforcement and settlements as well as for private actions.
Additionally, as far as tools of detection are concerned, Hong Kong appears
to have embraced broader leniency policies. In both jurisdictions,
whistleblowing is encouraged.
A.

Fining the Infringers

First, competition authorities seek to fine the infringers. Hong Kong
and China differ fundamentally in the requirements to be met for issuing a
fine, however. In China, as explained above,162 although the level of fines
imposed appears to be relatively low, the SAMR has wide latitude to
impose fines.
In Hong Kong, to the contrary: 1) as a result of the adoption of an
adversarial system of enforcement163 the HKCC must institute proceedings
before the HKCT, 164 but 2) agreements and conduct “of lesser
significance” are statutorily exempt from investigation. 165 Specifically,
agreements between parties with a combined turnover of less than HK$200
million are exempt from application of the First Conduct Rule,166 although
this exemption does not apply to instances of serious anti-competitive
conduct.167 Firms with less than HK$40 million of turnover per year are
exempt from the Second Conduct Rule. 168 This is potentially a serious
impediment to effective enforcement—deciding not to investigate de
minimis agreements should be a matter for the authorities’ discretion based
on factors such as the size and competitiveness of the market, rather than
DIGICHINA (Jan. 10, 2022), https://digichina.stanford.edu/work/translation-internet-information-servicealgorithmic-recommendation-management-provisions-effective-march-1-2022/; see also Kimberly
Adams & Daniel Shin, A Closer Look at China’s New Algorithm Regulations, MARKETPLACE (Mar. 1,
2022), https://www.marketplace.org/shows/marketplace-tech/a-closer-look-at-chinas-new-algorithmregulations/.
162
See supra Section I.D.
163
See infra Section III.A.
164
Competition Ordinance, supra note 16, pt. 6, §§ 93–93 (Enforcement before Tribunal); id.
sched. 3 (Orders that may be made by Tribunal in Relation to Contraventions of Competition Rules).
165
Id. sched. 1, § 5.
166
Id. sched. 1, § 5(a).
167
For an explanation of what constitutes serious anti-competitive conduct see supra Section I.A.1
and note 46.
168
Competition Ordinance, supra note 16, sched. 1, § 6(1).
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the turnover of the parties. For example, in 2011 the HK$200 million
exemption could have resulted in agreements of up to eighteen169 small and
medium enterprises potentially being exempted from the First Conduct
Rule. Further: 3) in the case of breaches of the First Conduct Rule that are
not cartels or other instances of serious anti-competitive conduct,170 the
HKCC must first issue a “warning notice” against the infringing parties
and can only institute proceedings against the parties in the HKCT if the
misconduct persists. 171 This enforcement scheme can be difficult to
administer, as it may not always be clear that a course of conduct meets the
requirements of serious anti-competitive conduct.172
B.

Reaching Settlements

Second, the authorities can reach a settlement with the parties under
investigation. Unlike the settlement system in Europe,173 if the parties to
an investigation reach a settlement with the authorities and the settlement
is accepted, in China and in Hong Kong, the authorities will end the
investigation and will not issue a fine.
In Hong Kong, section 60 of the CO specifically allows for the
HKCC to end an investigation by accepting commitments offered by the
parties. This procedure does not require that the parties admit to a breach
of a conduct rule: if they do not, third parties do not have a follow-on right
of action for damages against the infringers.174 This procedure has been
used in two cases, namely Seaport Alliance175 and Online Travel Agents
(OTAs), 176 mentioned above. In Online Travel Agents major OTAs
(Expedia.com, Booking.com, and Trip.com) entered into so-called “parity”
clauses with hotels in Hong Kong. The hotels were required to give to the
169

See Lin & Ross, supra note 43, at n.40. The average annual turnover of small and medium
enterprises in Hong Kong was HK$11 million in 2011.
170
For an explanation of what constitutes serious anti-competitive conduct see supra Section I.A.1
and note 46.
171
Competition Ordinance, supra note 16, § 82.
172
Kelvin Hiu Fai Kwok, The New Hong Kong Competition Law: Anomalies and Challenges, 37
WORLD COMPETITION 541, 562 (2014) [hereinafter Fai Kwok, New Hong Kong Competition Law]; Lin
& Ross, supra note 43, at 121.
173
In Europe, under Article 10(a) of Commission Regulation (EC) No. 773/2004, the parties can
engage in settlement discussions with the European Commission. If they agree upon a settlement, they
can benefit from a ten percent fine reduction. See also Commission Notice on the Conduct of Settlement
Procedures in View of the Adoption of Decisions Pursuant to Article 7 and Article 23 of Council
Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 in Cartel Cases, 2008 O.J. (C 167) 1.
174
Competition Ordinance, supra note 16, § 110; see also infra section II.C.
175
H.K. Competition Comm’n, Case EC/03AY Notice Regarding the Commission’s Acceptance
of Commitments in the Hong Kong Seaboard Alliance Case (Oct. 30, 2020), https://www.compcomm.h
k/en/enforcement/registers/commitments/files/Notice_of_Acceptance_Eng.pdf].
176
H.K. Competition Comm’n, Notice Issued under Section 4 of Schedule 2 of the Competition
Ordinance Regarding the Commission’s Acceptance of Commitments in Online Travel Agents Case
(EC/02NJ) (May 13, 2020), https://www.compcomm.hk/en/enforcement/registers/commitments/files/E
NG_Notice_of_Acceptance_OTA.pdf.
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OTAs terms regarding room prices, conditions, and availability that were
at least the same as those they offered to any other sales channels. The
HKCC accepted a settlement that the three OTAs would not enter into
parity clauses for a period of five years and would self-report their
compliance. Compared to similar cases in Europe, this is a cautious
approach. In 2015, Booking.com announced that they were amending
parity provisions in their contracts throughout Europe, following
commitments accepted in France, Italy, and Sweden.177
Commitments can also be accepted to terminate an investigation
after the HKCC issues an infringement notice under section 67(2) of the
CO. This settlement possibility applies in cases of breaches of the First
Conduct Rule that involve serious anti-competitive conduct178 and actions
under the Second Conduct Rule. The HKCC has applied it in two First
Conduct Rule cases to date, Tourist Attraction Tickets and Quantr. In both
cases, the HKCC required the parties to admit infringement of the Rule as
part of the settlement. As indicated below, 179 this is significant for the
availability of private actions for damages in Hong Kong.
In Tourist Attraction Tickets, six hotel groups and an operator of
tour counters were issued infringement notices.180 The HKCC found that
the defendants acted as facilitators in a price-fixing agreement for tourist
attractions and transportation tickets sold in Hong Kong hotels. The
defendants also facilitated a cartel between two travel service providers,
Gray Line Tours of Hong Kong and Tink Labs Limited.181 The parties
accepted the settlement, which included admitting that they contravened
the First Conduct Rule and a commitment to increase competition
compliance within their businesses.182 The HKCC subsequently terminated
the investigation.

177
See Booking.com to Amend Parity Provisions throughout Europe, BOOKING.COM (June 25,
2015), https://news.booking.com/bookingcom-to-amend-parity-provisions-throughout-europe/.
178
For breaches of the First Conduct Rule that do not involve serious anti-competitive conduct, the
HKCC needs to issue a “warning notice.” See Competition Ordinance, supra note 16, § 82.
179
See infra Section II.C.
180
See Infringement Notices Register, COMPETITION COMM’N, https://www.compcomm.hk/en/en
forcement/registers/infringement_notices/infringement.html (last visited May 25, 2022) (detailing the
infringement notices and the commitments accepted).
181
Separately, the HKCC has also taken the case against the two travel service providers to the
HKCT. Press Release, H.K. Competition Comm’n, Competition Commission Takes Travel
Services Sector Price-fixing Cartel Case to Competition Tribunal (Jan. 20, 2022), https://www.compco
mm.hk/en/media/press/files/PR_Travel_Services_Sector_Cartel_EN.pdf.
182
Press Release, H.K. Competition Comm’n, Competition Comm’n Issues Infringement Notices
to Six Hotel Groups and a Tour Counter Operator for Facilitating a Price-fixing Cartel
(Feb. 17, 2021), https://www.compcomm.hk/en/media/press/files/EN_PR_Infringement_Notices_Touri
st_Attraction_Tickets.pdf [hereinafter Infringement Notices].
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In Quantr,183 infringement notices were issued against both Quantr
and a software supplier, Nintex Proprietary Limited, for their involvement
in a bid-rigging cartel for the provision of IT services. Quantr did not
accept the commitments and the case was then brought in the HKCT, where
the company was fined HK$37,702.26 (less than $5,000).184 By contrast,
Nintex did accept the infringement notice,185 admitted they had infringed
the First Conduct Rule, and took steps to strengthen their compliance
program. The HKCC terminated the investigation.
In China, in the published guidelines on monopoly agreements,186
the SAMR specifies that the parties to an investigation can offer
commitments and request a suspension of an investigation187 for all AML
violations, except for hardcore cartels (i.e., for price fixing, output
restrictions and market allocation).188 In this sense, the procedure available
in China is similar to the commitment procedure available in Europe.189
This is an important difference respecting the position in Hong Kong,
where the settlement procedure is available to hardcore cartelists. If
defendants’ commitment and settlement proposal is accepted, the SAMR
will suspend or terminate an investigation. When this happens, similar to
the position in Hong Kong, there is no finding as to the liability of the
businesses in question and therefore no pecuniary sanctions are levied.190
The parties that enter into a settlement agreement with the SAMR can still
be sued in civil litigation, however, as will be seen below.

183

Competition Comm’n v. Quantr Ltd., [2020] H.K.C.T. 2 (H.K.). The case is summarized in the
Commission’s 2020 Annual Report. See COMPETITION COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT 2020/2021, 32
(2021), https://www.compcomm.hk/en/media/reports_publications/files/2020_21_CC_Annual_Report.
Pdf [hereinafter COMPETITION COMM’N 2020/2021 ANNUAL REPORT].
184
Competition Comm’n v. Quantr Ltd., [2020] H.K.C.T. 2 (H.K.).
185
H.K. Competition Comm’n, Notice Issued Under Section 67 of the Competition Ordinance
(Cap. 619) Regarding Anti-Competitive Conduct in Ocean Park Bidding Exercise of 10 January 2020,
https://www.compcomm.hk/en/enforcement/registers/infringement_notices/files/Infringement_Notice_
Eng_20200110.pdf (last visited May 25, 2022).
186
Jìnzhǐ lǒngduàn xiéyì zhàn háng guiding (禁止壟斷協議暫行規定) [Interim Provisions on
Prohibiting Monopoly Agreements] (promulgated by the State Admin. for Mkt. Regul.,
July 1, 2019, rev’d March 24, 2022, effective May 1, 2022) (Lawinfochina)
[hereinafter
Interim
Provisions on Prohibiting Monopoly Agreements].
187
Id. This is the first time that a Chinese competition authority has issued guidelines in a published
book. See Zhaofeng Zhou, China: Settling Conduct Matters with the SAMR, GLOBAL
COMPETITION REV. (Feb. 2, 2021), https://globalcompetitionreview.com/guide/the-settlements-guide/
first-edition/article/china-settling-conduct-matters-the-samr.
188
Interim Provisions on Prohibiting Monopoly Agreements, supra note 186, art. 22.
189
In the European Union, under Article 9 of Council Regulation 1/2003, the parties can offer
commitments to settle an investigation. European Commission Memorandum MEMO/04/217,
Commitment Decisions (Article 9 of Council Regulation 1/2003 Providing for a Modernised Framework
for Antitrust Scrutiny of Company Behavior) (Sept. 17, 2004). Id.
190
China Anti-Monopoly Law, supra note 18, art. 45.
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Private Enforcement

There is widespread acknowledgment that private litigation in China
is on the rise, generally.191 Over the years, there has also been a gradual
increase of private actions against State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and
governmental agencies.192 In China, private actions are available, both as
stand-alone claims (brought for an alleged breach when a competent
authority has not already declared it an infringement) and as follow-on
private actions (brought for damages arising from a breach that has been
established in a decision of a competent authority). In Hong Kong, only
follow-on private actions can be brought.
Private actions for breaches of competition law are available in
China under Article 50 of the AML. The Supreme People’s Court (SPC)
has issued guidance on both stand-alone claims and follow-on private
actions.193 Beginning in 2017, there has been a growing number of private
antitrust actions against tech companies.194 In 2017, JD.com filed a lawsuit
against Alibaba for “choose one from two” abusive conduct.195 This case
has dragged on, as Alibaba argued that the appropriate forum is not Beijing,
but Hangzhou, Alibaba’s headquarters. The SPC held in 2019 that the
Beijing court had jurisdiction, 196 but the case is not yet concluded.
Similarly, in February 2021, Douyin, an app that specializes in short videos
owned by ByteDance, reportedly sued Tencent Holdings for abuse of
dominance.197
The combined pressure of antitrust infringement decisions in the
sector, new regulations, and private actions seems to have borne fruit.
Although these cases remain pending, in September 2021, Tencent opened
access to its giant WeChat app to competitors (including Taobao and

191

GIBSON DUNN, supra note 136, at 7.
See BAKER MCKENZIE, GLOBAL GUIDE TO COMPETITION LITIGATION 53 (2016), https://www.
bakermckenzie.com/-/media/files/expertise/antitrust/global_guide_to_competition_litigationfinal.pdf?l
a=en.
193
Zuìgāo rénmín fǎyuàn guānyú shěnlǐ yīn lǒngduàn xíngwéi yǐnfā de mínshì jiūfēn ànjiàn
yìngyòng fǎlǜ ruògān wèntí de guiding (最高人民法院关于审理因垄断行为引发的民事纠纷案件应
用法律若干问题的规定) [Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues Concerning the
Application of Law in the Trial of Civil Dispute Cases Arising from Monopolistic Conduct [2012]
(promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., May 3, 2012, effective June 1, 2012), art. 4 (Lawinfochina).
194
GIBSON DUNN, supra note 136, at 8–9; see also Fay Zhou et al., The Private Competition
Enforcement Review: China, THE LAW REVS. (Feb. 25, 2022), https://thelawreviews.co.uk/title/theprivate-competition-enforcement-review/china.
195
The practice of Chinese platforms to impose a requirement that users choose exclusively one
platform is known as “choose one from two.” See supra section I.B and note 81.
196
Jīngdōng sù tiān māo jí ālǐ lànyòng shìchǎng zhīpèi dìwèi “èr xuǎn yī” dì yī àn jiāng kāitíng (
京东诉天猫及阿里滥用市场支配地位 “二选一”第一案将开庭) [JD.com Sues Tmall and Alibaba
for Abuse of Market Dominance], SOHU (Nov. 26, 2020), https://www.sohu.com/a/434515914_260616.
197
ByteDance’s Douyin Sues Tencent for Monopolistic Behaviour, REUTERS (Feb. 2, 2021),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-bytedance-idUSKBN2A2153.
192
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ByteDance), possibly due to litigation pressures.198 In a jurisdiction where
judicial scrutiny of the authorities’ decisions is weak, 199 private
enforcement may become a preferred route to redress.
The original Bill for the introduction of a competition law in Hong
Kong allowed victims of anticompetitive actions to claim damages in
stand-alone private actions. 200 However, this provision was ultimately
deleted due to the government’s effort to secure the business community’s
support for the adoption of the CO.201 Nonetheless, there is certainly an
appetite in Hong Kong for stand-alone private actions. In an early case,
Loyal Profit International Development Ltd v. Travel Industry Council of
Hong Kong,202 the plaintiff sought to obtain a declaration and an injunction
against the practices of the Travel Industry Council of Hong Kong.203
The CO provides for a right to bring a follow-on private action
against “a person” who “has contravened,” “is contravening,”204 or “has
been or is involved in the contravention of” a conduct rule.205 At the time
of writing (April 2022), these provisions remain untested in the Hong Kong
courts.
It follows that a finding that an infringement has taken place is a
precondition for a follow-on private action in Hong Kong. As mentioned
above, 206 under the settlement procedure, the HKCC has the option to
require settling defendants to admit their infringement. In both Tourist
Attractions Tickets207 and Quantr208 the defendants admitted the breach of
the First Conduct Rule, allowing for the possibility of a follow-on private
action. However, unlike in many other jurisdictions, including in Europe,
admission of guilt is not a requirement for a settlement. If the HKCC does
not request admission of liability, aggrieved third parties cannot bring a
follow-on action against the infringers.
198

Zheping Huang & Coco Liu, Tencent Opens WeChat to Rivals’ Links as China App Walls
Crumble, TIME (Sep. 17, 2021), https://time.com/6099059/tencent-wechat-rivals/.
199
See infra Section III.B.
200
Mark Williams, The Lion City and the Fragrant Harbour: The Political Economy of
Competition Policy in Hong Kong and Singapore Compared, 54 THE ANTITRUST BULL. 517, 568 (2009).
201
The original bill was more ambitious in its proposals. Due to opposition from the business
community (including from small and medium enterprises (SMEs)), the original provisions were watered
down. On private actions, SMEs expressed the concern that large companies could make use of the
provision to harass them. For an overview of the changes between the original proposals and what
became the CO, see John M. Hickin et al., Hong Kong Government Announces Significant Changes to
Its Competition Bill, LEXOLOGY (Oct. 19, 2011), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=320e
a56e-ad58-4e59-a0c9-a670591ec5f5.
202
Loyal Profit Int’l Dev. Ltd. v. Travel Industry Council of H.K., [2016] H.C.M.P. 256 (C.F.I).
203
The court held that under the terms of the CO it is “for the Competition Commission (not private
parties) to bring a complaint of infringement of competition rules to the Competition Tribunal for
adjudication.” Id. at ¶ 47.
204
Competition Ordinance, supra note 16, § 110(1)(a).
205
Id. § 110(1)(b).
206
See supra Section II.C.
207
Infringement Notices, supra note 182.
208
Competition Comm’n v. Quantr Ltd., [2020], H.K.C.T. 10 (H.K.).
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Leniency

When a business involved in a cartel self-reports its anticompetitive
conduct and submits significant evidence, the competition authorities in
both China and Hong Kong may, at their discretion, grant full immunity or
a reduction in fines.
In Hong Kong, the HKCC adopted leniency policies that encourage
self-reporting (unusually, the CO allows for leniency to be granted for a
breach of the First or the Second Conduct Rule,209 but to date the HKCC
has only enacted policies to deal with leniency for cartel conduct, under the
First Conduct Rule). The HKCC issued its first leniency policy in 2015 and
substantially revised it in 2020.210 At the same time as the 2020 revision,
the HKCC also adopted a leniency policy for individuals, such as
employees or former employees of a company.211 The leniency policy has
already been successful. In Quantr, 212 the cartel was brought to the
HKCC’s attention by the co-bidder as a leniency applicant. Businesses that
do not qualify for the leniency policy can enter into a cooperation
agreement with the HKCC under the Cooperation and Settlement Policy,213
which allows parties cooperating with an investigation to receive a
discount of up to fifty percent on the applicable fine. The Cooperation and
Settlement Policy also introduces a “leniency plus” regime. If a business
enters into a cooperation agreement in relation to a cartel and discloses the
existence of a second cartel, the HKCC can apply an extra discount of ten
percent of the recommended pecuniary penalty against the first cartel.
In China, the legal basis for the availability of leniency is Article
46(2) of the AML. Leniency is only available for horizontal monopoly
agreements between competitors, as defined in Articles 13 and 14 of the
AML (in particular cartels). This follows precedent from other
jurisdictions, and indeed is the same in Hong Kong. The SAMR issued its
own Leniency Guidelines in June 2020.214 The first applicant to provide
evidence of a cartel not yet under investigation, and to provide material
209

Competition Ordinance, supra note 16, § 80.
COMPETITION COMM’N, LENIENCY POLICY FOR UNDERTAKINGS ENGAGED IN CARTEL CONDUCT
(2020), https://www.compcomm.hk/en/legislation_guidance/policy_doc/files/Leniency_Policy_Undert
akings_E.pdf [hereinafter LENIENCY POLICY FOR UNDERTAKINGS].
211
COMPETITION COMM’N, LENIENCY POLICY FOR INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED IN CARTEL CONDUCT
(2020), https://www.compcomm.hk/en/legislation_guidance/policy_doc/files/Leniency_Policy_Individ
uals_E.pdf [hereinafter LENIENCY POLICY FOR INDIVIDUALS].
212
Competition Comm’n v. Quantr Ltd., [2020], H.K.C.T. 10 (H.K.).
213
COMPETITION COMM’N, COOPERATION AND SETTLEMENT POLICY FOR UNDERTAKINGS
ENGAGED IN CARTEL CONDUCT (2019), https://www.compcomm.hk/en/legislation_guidance/policy_do
c/files/Cooperation_Policy_Eng.pdf.
214
Héngxiàng lǒngduàn xiéyì ànjiàn kuāndà zhìdù shìyòng zhǐnán (横向垄断协议案件宽大制度
适 用 指 南 ) [Guidelines for the Application of Leniency Program in Horizontal Monopoly
Agreement Cases] (promulgated by the State Admin. for Mkt. Regul., Jan. 4, 2019, effective Sept. 18,
2020) [hereinafter SAMR Leniency Policy].
210
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evidence not yet in possession of the SAMR can be granted immunity or
leniency of not less than eighty percent.215 The second applicant’s fine can
be mitigated between thirty to fifty percent, and the third by between
twenty to thirty percent. Subsequent applicants can receive a discount of
no more than twenty percent.
Although formal leniency policies are a relatively new tool in China,
leniency (in exchange for cooperation with authorities) seems to have been
a feature in the enforcement of the AML from the start. Amongst the cases
reviewed,216 leniency was granted in at least nineteen cases, beginning with
the Rice Noodles Cartel sanctioned by the Guanxi Price Bureau in March
2010, one of the first cases decided under the AML and Price Law.217 In
the international LCD Panel Manufacturing Cartel case,218 decided under
the Price Law (as the breaches preceded the entry into force of the AML),
the sanctions imposed 219 were “relatively low” due to the participants’
cooperation. Leniency in the formal sense of being recognized as a specific
tool for detection under the terms of the AML220 was applied for the first
time in the Sea Sand Cartel case221 by the Guangdong Price Bureau under
guidance from the National Development and Reform Commission
(NDRC), one of the precursor competition agencies to the SAMR. Of the
ninety-five cases identified, 222 leniency considerations led to firms
receiving total exemption from fines in twelve cases.223
215

Id. art. 13.
See infra app.
217
Memorandum from Cleary Gottlieb on First Price Cartel Cases Under the Chinese AML (May
21, 2020), https://www.clearygottlieb.com/-/media/organize-archive/cgsh/files/publication-pdfs/firstprice-cartel-cases-under-the-chinese-aml.pdf (discussing the Rice Noodles Cartel); see also Xue Qiang
& Yang Xixi, Anti-Cartel Law and Enforcement in China: A Survey, in CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW:
THE FIRST FIVE YEARS §§ 6.01, 6.03[A][8] (Adrian Emch & David Stallibrass eds., 2013) (discussing
the Rice Noodles Cartel).
218
Xue & Yang, supra note 217, § 6.03[A][8] (discussing the LCD Panel Manufacturing Cartel).
219
By the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), the predecessor agency to the
SAMR.
220
SAMR Leniency Policy, supra note 214, art. 46(2).
221
Xue & Yang, supra note 217, § 6.03[A][7] (discussing the Sea Sand Cartel).
222
See sources cited infra app.
223
The cartels were the Infant Formula Milk Cartel, the Zhejiang Car Insurance Cartel, the Hubei
Car Distribution Cartel, the 12 Japanese Auto Parts and Bearing Manufacturers Cartel, the Roll-on/Rolloff Freight Service Cartel, the Yongzhou Concrete Industry Cartel, the Tianjin Port Yard Cartel, the
Zhejian Concrete Manufacturers Cartel, the Hunan Liquified Gas Suppliers Cartel, the Ningxia Used Car
Dealers Cartel, the Jiangxing Used Car Industry Cartel, and the Bulk Cement Supply: Sichuan Cement
Association Cartel. See HANNAH HA ET AL., supra note 50, at 42 (discussing the Infant Formula Milk
Cartel); COMPETITION BULLETIN SEPT./OCT. 2014, supra note 50, at 1 (discussing the Zhejiang Car
Insurance Cartel); MELBOURNE L. SCH., CHINA COMPETITION BULLETIN JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2016, 8
(Allan Fels et al. eds., 40th ed. 2016), https://law.unimelb.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0004/1950520/
China-Competition-Bulletin-Jan-Feb-2016.pdf (discussing the Hubei Car Distribution Cartel, the 12
Japanese Auto Parts and Bearing Manufacturers Cartel, the Roll-on/Roll-off Freight Service Cartel, and
the Yongzhou Concrete Industry Cartel); MORGAN LEWIS, GLOBAL CARTEL ENFORCEMENT REPORT 17
(2018), https://www.morganlewis.com/documents/m/documents/cartel/cartel-report_end-2018_190022.
pdf (discussing the Tianjin Port Yard Cartel); Yong Bai, China: Overview, GLOB. COMPETITION REV.
216
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Whistleblowing

Finally, whistleblowing is also a powerful tool for detection.
Whistleblowing is a relatively common practice in Hong Kong. In the
period since its inception in 2013 through November 2020, the HKCC
received “around 4,600 enquiries and complaints, of which sixty percent
were on the First Conduct Rule with cartel conduct, including price fixing,
being a major concern.”224 The press release issued by the HKCC after the
HKCT handed down its first two judgments makes it clear that the two
cases in question were “[d]iscovered as a result of complaints from
members of the public.” 225 These findings are also in line with survey
results, such as the Freshfields 2020 whistleblowing survey, where [fortyeight percent] of respondents in Hong Kong reported “they had been
involved in whistleblowing.”226 This is so even though there are limited
specific protections for whistleblowers in Hong Kong and no financial
incentives for blowing the whistle. Possible reasons include that a
successful whistleblowing mechanism exists in Hong Kong in the finance
sector and the Hong Kong Stock Exchange is very focused on corporate
governance issues, including ensuring that listed companies have an
escalation policy that allows employees to report wrongdoings.227
Like in Hong Kong, in China individuals are increasingly blowing
the whistle.228 This is borne out by the case law: the reasons range from
recent legislative developments incentivizing whistleblowing, to the
influence of social media.
The very first cartel fines issued under the AML, in the Concrete
Industry - Jiangsu Cartel case229 was investigated following complaints by
whistleblowers unhappy about the cartel set up by the Committee for
(Apr. 21, 2021), https://globalcompetitionreview.com/review/the-asia-pacific-antitrust-review/2021/arti
cle/china-overview (discussing the Zhejiang Concrete Manufacturers Cartel); CLIFFORD CHANCE, supra
note 73, at 12 (discussing the Hunan Liquified Gas Suppliers Cartel, the Ningxia Used Car Dealers Cartel,
the Jiangxing Used Car Industry Cartel, and the Bulk Cement Supply Cartel.
224
Press Release, H.K. Competition Comm’n, Competition Commission Launches “Combat Price
Fixing Cartels” Campaign (Nov. 9, 2020), https://www.compcomm.hk/en/media/press/files/EN_PR_C
C_launches_Combat_Price_Fixing_Cartels_Campaign_20201109.pdf.
225
Press Release, H.K. Competition Comm’n, Competition Commission Welcomes Judgments in
Hong Kong’s First Two Competition Cases (May 17, 2019), https://www.compcomm.hk/en/media/pres
s/files/20190517_Competition_Commission_welcomes_judgments_in_Hong_Kong_s_first_two_comp
etition_cases_eng.pdf.
226
Nicola Jones & Stephanie Chiu, Whistleblowing in the Spotlight: Why are Managers in Hong
Kong More Likely to Blow the Whistle?, LEXOLOGY (Oct. 15, 2020), https://www.lexology.com/library
/detail.aspx?g=293001aa-ab47-447d-b1d7-204fb1172a99.
227
Id.
228
Fan Li & Stephanie Chiu, Whistleblowing in the Spotlight—What is Happening in Mainland
China?, FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS DERINGER (Nov. 6, 2020), https://riskandcompliance.freshfields.co
m/post/102gjm1/whistleblowing-in-the-spotlight-what-is-happening-in-mainland-china.
229
See Henry L.T. Chen & Frank Schoneveld, First Cartel Fines in China Following New
Regulations, LEXOLOGY (Feb. 25, 2011), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=cf8c33552c04-44b6-985f-72590f37896b.
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Concrete of Lianyungang City Construction Material and Machinery
Association. The same year, in the Package Industry Cartel case, 230
whistleblowers complained about a cartel coordinated by the industry
association. In 2012, an investigation of the Wuxi Quarry Operators
Cartel 231 started based on information received from the Wuxi County
Public Security Bureau. A “public complaint” filed in July 2013 triggered
the investigation of the Mayang Shale Brick Cartel.232 In the later Haier
RPM case, 233 the investigation began in response to multiple reports made
through the NDRC’s “12358 price supervision platform” in June 2015. As
seen above, local e-commerce companies have allegedly been reporting
cartels in the courier industry (e.g. Ningxia Courier Companies Cartel).234
In the Xiamen Courier Industry Price Self-Discipline Convention Cartel,235
fourteen courier companies agreed to minimum shipping prices, seemingly
in response to concerns regarding the development of e-commerce. The
Xiamen Price Bureau intervened to stop this conduct and increase AML
compliance. Although not explicitly stated, it is possible that this action by
the Xiamen Price Bureau was the result of whistle blowing by e-commerce
companies.
Notwithstanding these recent developments, and although there is
no official translation of the term in Chinese, whistleblowing is “an ageold practice dating back to the imperial time[.]”236 The term Jubao (舉報:
literally, “reporting”) is a new term which emerged from recent
anticorruption campaigns. 237 The main aim of jubao is to report the
wrongdoing of public officials and managers of companies. This is
different from the narrow Western concept of an employee reporting their
organization, usually after having exhausted internal procedures. In China,
the concept is both “broader in terms of who can blow the whistle” (any
ordinary citizen can do so) and “slightly narrower as to whistleblowing
channels” (it often consists of reports made to official centers and
supervisory organs).238

230

See Xue & Yang, supra note 217, § 6.06 (discussing the Package Industry Cartel).
For a discussion of the Wuxi Quarry Operators Cartel, see COMPETITION BULLETIN JAN./FEB.
2015, supra note 24, at 4.
232
See cases cited infra app.
233
MELBOURNE L. SCH., CHINA COMPETITION BULLETIN JULY/AUGUST 2016, 3 (Allan Fels et al.
eds., 43d ed. 2016), https://law.unimelb.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0003/2105238/China-Competitio
n-Bulletin-July-August-2016.pdf (discussing the Haier RPM case).
234
COMPETITION BULLETIN MAR./APR. 2014, supra note 24.
235
Id.
236
Ting Gong, Whistleblowing: what does it mean in China?, 23 INT’L J. PUB. ADMIN. 1899, 1900
(2000).
237
Id. at 1902.
238
Id. at 1903.
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As of yet, there is no formal centralized policy to deal with
whistleblowing in antitrust matters,239 but regulatory measures sometimes
promise rewards to whistleblowers, for example to those reporting safety
and counterfeiting issues.240 In September 2019, the State Council issued
“Guiding Opinions on Strengthening and Standardizing In-process and Expost Regulation” 241 (Whistleblowing Guiding Opinions). This required
provincial governments and various ministries and agencies under the State
Council to establish reward systems for whistle-blowers. In November
2019, the SAMR issued draft provisions purporting to grant financial
rewards for whistleblowers that report serious violation of law, 242
including violations of competition law. 243 These provisions remain in
draft form. If adopted, whistleblowers under this reward scheme would
receive substantially more than what is currently available under other
financial reward provisions: they could receive as much as five percent of
the fine paid, 244 up to a maximum of ¥1,000,000, or, for reporting
violations of “systemic and regional risks” or that “have or may cause
major social harm,” up to ¥two million.245
III.

THE INSTITUTIONAL SETUP

Hong Kong has adopted an adversarial system 246 and China an
administrative system 247 of enforcement of the antitrust rules. There is
limited evidence as to the relative merits of the two regimes. Based on
simplified economic models, adversarial methods of enforcement have
been found to be more effective against decision-maker bias, while
administrative systems arguably have a better mechanism for uncovering
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市场监督管理总局关于《市场监管领域重大违法行为举报奖励暂行办法（修订征求意见稿）》
公开征求意见的公告) [Announcement of the State Administration for Market Regulation on Public
Consultation on the Interim Measures for Reporting and Rewarding Major Illegal Acts in the Field of
Market Supervision (Revised Draft for Comment)] (promulgated by the State
Admin. for Mkt. Regul., Nov. 19, 2019).
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Id. art. 4.
244
Id. art. 12.
245
Id. art. 13.
246
The adversarial process is characterized by an impartial decision-maker (often a judge) with a
relatively passive role. See infra Section III.A.
247
The administrative process is characterized by agency discretion in the application of the rules,
from evidence gathering to issuing a decision. See infra Section III.B.

394

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 31 NO. 3

hidden information.248 On the other hand, though, administrative systems
are said to compound the issue of prosecutorial bias due to undue deference
by the courts, 249 particularly when undertaking “complex economic
assessments[.]”250 But adversarial systems are often characterized as “more
expensive and protracted”251 than administrative ones. This is especially
true in jurisdictions with only a modest history of applying competition
law, as judges often lack the expertise and resources required to assess
complex economic evidence.252
A comparative analysis of the systems of China and Hong Kong
shows that a properly functioning adversarial system must provide the
competition authority with access to the tools needed to carry out their
prosecutorial role. The judiciary interpretation of the burden of proof that
the HKCC must meet for the imposition of pecuniary penalties (the
criminal standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt) makes it very difficult
for the HKCC to enforce competition law in cases other than cartel cases
where evidence of wrongdoing is readily available. Obstacles to
enforcement proceedings can have a knock-on effect on the very ability of
the law to deter infringements, particularly in a system where the CO only
allows for the imposition of relatively low levels of fines on infringers in
Hong Kong anyway.253
For the proper working of administrative systems, the corrective
power of judicial scrutiny, some measure of independence between the
agency and the executive, and procedural limits on the discretion of the
authorities are all necessary to counter the potential for prosecutorial bias.
In China, all agencies are part of a very powerful overarching bureaucracy.
Within it, different agencies collaborate: a company that has a conflict with
one agency exposes itself to possible action by multiple agencies. Judicial
scrutiny, including of antitrust decisions, is weak and procedural
safeguards embryonic. This leads to impressive results and an enviable
speed of decision, but speed needs to be considered against the risks posed
by “unrestrained arbitrariness[.]”254
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The Adversarial System of Hong Kong

It has been said that the competition law regime in Hong Kong is a
“curious Frankenstein regime”255: while the substantive prohibitions are
based on the EU and Singapore models, procedurally Hong Kong has
adopted an adversarial regime. The adversarial process is characterized by
an impartial decision-maker (often a judge) with a relatively passive role.
The judge is not involved in gathering evidence or identifying the issues
but instead plays an adjudicative role. The parties “bear primary
responsibility for determining the sequence and manner in which evidence
is presented and legal issues are argued.”256 Generally speaking, common
law jurisdictions tend to adopt the adversarial system of competition law
enforcement, as, for example, in the United States, Australia, and Canada
(but not in the United Kingdom). In Hong Kong, the decision-maker with
adjudicative function is the HKCT.
The HKCC carries out both investigative and prosecutorial
functions, alongside other competition policy responsibilities,257 including
an advisory role (although it generally encourages businesses to carry out
a self-assessment of the legality of their agreements under the competition
rules, businesses can also ask for guidance). 258 The HKCC is an
independent statutory body in corporate form259 with a board of members
that manages an executive arm. The members are appointed by the head of
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (“SAR”), the Chief
Executive, but are removable only in specified circumstances. 260 The
HKCC’s executive arm is not part of the civil service,261 further enforcing
its independence.
Considering that it only began recruiting staff in May 2013,262 the
HKCC has been very active and has brought nine cases before the HKCT
since then. This level of activity has been possible due to substantial
government funding.263 In its latest annual report,264 the HKCC reported
government subvention of approximately HK$124.3 million
(approximately $16 million) and sixty-one staff members “as of March
255
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Laverne Jacobs et al., The Nature of Inquisitorial Processes in Administrative Regimes, 24
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See Anna Wu Hung-yuk, Hong Kong: Competition Commission, GLOB. COMPETITION REV.
(Feb. 19, 2015), https://globalcompetitionreview.com/review/the-asia-pacific-antitrust-review/the-asiapacific-antitrust-review-2015/article/hong-kong-competition-commission.
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2020.”265 These figures show an increase from the previous year (when the
HKCC reported government funding of approximately HK$105.3 million
and fifty-seven staff members). It has been noted that these high levels of
funding and staffing are broadly similar to Singapore competition authority
(before the latter also acquired consumer protection functions). 266
Interestingly, as detailed below, the SAMR in China reportedly only has
forty staff members dealing with antitrust matters at the central level.
The HKCT carries out the adjudicative function. Although its name,
Hong Kong Competition Tribunal, suggests competition law expertise, it
is in fact a specialist division of the Court of First Instance, which is
entirely comprised of generalist judges.267 Its judgments can be appealed
to the Court of Appeal and then the Court of Final Appeal. It also has
powers to determine follow-on actions that may be brought following the
HKCC’s finding of breach.
The HKCC has been remarkably successful in securing liability and
penalty judgments. However, the cases to date concerned instances of
serious anti-competitive conduct, where the HKCC had gathered
incontrovertible evidence of cartel activity. Following the Nutanix Bid
Rigging judgment,268 the standard of proof that the HKCC must meet in
proceedings for pecuniary penalties is now the criminal standard of proof
beyond reasonable doubt rather than the lower civil standard of proof on
the balance of probabilities. 269 Due to this higher standard of proof,
uncertainty hovers over the continued ability of the HKCC to impose
sanctions with a deterrent effect. The HKCC’s focus on hard-core cartels
may also be partly dictated by the need to meet the required burden of proof
before the HKCT.
The workability of the standard is even more doubtful for
competition law cases where complex assessments of economic data and
often conflicting expert evidence are required, such as for breaches of the
Second Conduct Rule. The judgment in Linde should clarify the judiciary’s
thinking on this issue. Indeed, as competition law enforcement becomes
more widespread and parties to cartels become more circumspect, even
direct evidence of price-fixing cartels may be hidden. If so, even in cartel
265
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267
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cases, the HKCC may have only circumstantial proof, let alone the
evidence required to satisfy the criminal standard of proof.
As has been remarked, 270 the criminal standard of proof in
competition law cases may be justified if the severity of the penalty
warrants it. This may be the case for individuals facing “truly criminal
sanctions for offences that are per se in nature”271 or, for businesses, “a
very high level of financial penalty that can be said to constitute the
functional equivalent of imprisonment of a human being,” 272 possibly
rendering the company insolvent or “at least unprofitable for some
significant period of time.”273 This is very far from the case here, given that
the penalty that can be imposed cannot exceed the statutory maximum of
ten percent of the turnover in Hong Kong for a maximum of three years.
As has been remarked, this leaves Hong Kong in an awkward position, “an
odd middle ground” on hard-core cartels, “without the deterrent power of
true criminal law…, but with a legal process that gives respondents the
protections of criminal law approach.”274
B.

The Administrative System of China

China has adopted a system of administrative enforcement. 275
Administrative enforcement is characterized by agency discretion in the
application of the rules, with the decision-maker playing an “active role in
identifying issues, gathering evidence[,] and controlling the
proceedings.” 276 Overall, administrative systems of enforcement are
adopted in the majority of jurisdictions that have enacted a competition
law, including the European Union and its member States, Japan, South
Korea, India, Malaysia, and the majority of Latin American countries.
The enforcement record of the AML by the SAMR and the AMEAs
in China is very impressive, particularly as the authorities have
traditionally been “extremely understaffed[.]”277 It was reported in April
2021 that the SAMR “plans to expand its antitrust workforce by around 20
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to 30 staff, up from about 40 now”.278 Although as a central authority the
SAMR can call on the AMEAs at local and regional levels, it is strikingly
that it has centrally twenty-one fewer enforcer than the sixty-one members
of staff reported in Hong Kong.
Low levels of staffing seem to be on the radar of policymakers in
Beijing. On November 19, 2021, the State Council of the People’s
Republic of China announced the establishment of a National AntiMonopoly Bureau (NAMB) to deal with competition matters. The NAMB
reportedly will have larger staff than the current SAMR.279
As has been extensively documented and analyzed,280 in China, the
SAMR and the AMEAs have very broad enforcement discretion in a
system characterized by limited judicial scrutiny. What has been called
“China’s great reversal in regulating the platform economy”281 provides a
good focal point to consider the policy control mechanisms of China more
generally. Specific to antitrust, while China’s administrative form of
enforcement guarantees efficiency and impressive results, this is often at
the expense of scrutiny, “agency accountability, legal consistency and due
process.”282 This is due to several reasons.
First, agencies that enforce the AML are part of the bureaucracy. In
countries with established competition and regulatory regimes, the
independence of regulatory and competition law agencies, especially from
government, is an aspiration.283 In the European Union, independence of
public bodies is frequently required by the Treaties and secondary law.284
While “independence” is not specifically defined, it generally refers to a
situation where a public body “can act completely freely, without taking
any instructions or being put under any pressure[,]”285 particularly by the
executive. As seen above, in Hong Kong the institutional setup of the
HKCC guarantees it a measure of independence. In the United States,
although the federal government retains control over the agencies, which
278
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“remain susceptible to shifting policy winds in Washington[,]”286 the clear
delineation of authority between federal, state, and county governments,
press scrutiny, and strict judicial oversight give agencies a relatively high
degree of independence from the executive, compared to China.287
In China, the SAMR, like its predecessors, is a Ministry-level
agency with multiple duties, including enforcement of the competition
rules. It sits directly under the State Council of China.288 The new NAMB
would appear to enjoy higher bureaucratic status289 than the current AntiMonopoly Bureau within SAMR. While the latter is a small division fully
integrated within the SAMR, the NAMB is likely to be a “semiautonomous body under the SAMR[.]” Continuity with the SAMR will be
ensured: the NAMB’s headquarters are in the same building as the SAMR
and the deputy head of the SAMR, Gan Lin, has been appointed head of
the NAMB.290 The NAMB should have a higher level of independency and
visibility, but it will obviously still be part of the overarching bureaucracy
of the Chinese state, where the leadership in Beijing “enjoys the highest
authority and wields tremendous power.”291 Because all agencies derive
their legitimacy from the delegation of power by the top leadership and the
central government, “the whole bureaucracy is organized based on an
upward accountability system.”292
This structure highlights the second point to be made, namely that
inter-agency and inter-ministry cooperation is essential in China for
antitrust enforcement. Decisions are reached by consensus, with the agency
in charge of an investigation requesting the input of other organizations.
This practice is known as “huiquian” (會簽, “countersign”):293 if the
different Ministries and agencies agree with a proposed course of action,
the State Council will ratify it. If not, the State Council must reach its own
decision after extensive research and more consultation with different
ministries. Inevitably, decisions are influenced by different views, which
makes them appear, on occasion, inconsistent with economic principles
and international standards. Interestingly, as discussed below, 294 the
behavioral remedies imposed by the SAMR in Meituan included a
commitment to treating drivers fairly, reflecting concerns about the
treatment of drivers across different agencies. The Ministry of Transport,
286
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the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) and the Ministry of
Industry and Information Technology have all intervened against ridehailing apps, ordering them to treat drivers more fairly.295
It follows that antitrust rules are but one potential enforcement action
Big Tech now faces, and the SAMR is only one of a number of agencies
they need to deal with. For example, immediately after their listing on the
New York stock exchange, 296 the CAC announced a “Cybersecurity
review”297 of Didi, the Chinese ride-hailing and mobility app. Financial
authorities have taken the lead against Ant Financial (Ant), the fintech
giant set up by Alibaba’s founder, Jack Ma,298 days before it was due to be
listed in an initial public offering (IPO) on the New York stock exchange.
After the IPO was halted on November 3, 2020, Ant was summoned to a
meeting by the People’s Bank of China (PBOC), the Insurance and
Banking Regulatory Commission, the China Securities and Exchange
Commission, and the Foreign Exchange Commission.299
More generally, in January 2021, the PBOC made public its draft
regulations on non-banking payment institutions (such as Ant Group,
Alipay, Tencent, and WeChat Pay).300 If finalized, the PBOC will have the
power to send alerts to SAMR whenever a non-banking payment institution
reaches certain market shares (lower than the shares for dominance under
the AML).
This interdependence between agencies makes companies operating
in China particularly susceptible to an array of regulatory attacks: a conflict
with any one of them can aggravate a company’s relationship with the
295
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others. This may explain the reluctance of the parties to an investigation to
challenge the authorities, as we have seen in Alibaba, Meituan, and
Sherpa’s, amongst others.301
Third, judicial scrutiny of the authorities’ decisions tends to be weak
in China. By way of example, of the ninety-five cases on anticompetitive
agreements identified, 302 only three were appealed. The appeals were
against the local AMEAs (rather than the all-powerful central authorities).
They were all unsuccessful. 303 The most interesting case concerned an
appeal by Yutai, a fish feed company fined by the Hainan DRC for RPM.304
The company challenged the decision and won in the first instance at the
Haikou Intermediate People’s Court. After this, “NDRC officials travelled
to Hainan to lobby the local government”305 and the Hainan High Court
reversed the judgment. Yutai subsequently appealed to the SPC and lost.
While the SPC acknowledged that RPM could have procompetitive effects,
it found that the per se illegality of RPM was justified “on the grounds that
the Chinese market was not yet fully developed, and competition continues
to be weak.”306 According to the SPC, “requiring the administrative agency
to satisfy a high burden of proof could have a chilling effect on public
enforcement.”307 This sharply contrasts with the case law in Hong Kong.
The fourth point concerns the nature of the companies investigated.
The current backlash against the platform economy in China can also be
seen as a “dramatic clash between public and private power[.]” 308 The
Chinese platform economy is dominated by private companies but much
of Chinese traditional economy relies on SOEs. These are part of the
bureaucracy, with a rank determined by their governance. The 2011
antitrust investigation of China Telecoms and China Unicom, two powerful
SOEs owned by the central government, is illustrative of the stringent
301
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bureaucratic constraints that apply.309 In the Chinese bureaucracy, the rank
of the leaders of China Unicom and China Telecom was equal to that of
the leader of the investigating agency (the precursor to the SAMR, the
NDRC), outstripping that of the Director General of the Antitrust Bureau
within the NDRC, which was responsible for antitrust matters. Central
SOEs are also overseen by the powerful State-owned Assets Supervision
and Administration Commission (SASAC), whose goal is to maximize the
value of the assets it oversees—antitrust penalties impact share
performance and asset value. Ultimately, the investigation of China
Unicom and China Telecom resulted in a commitment on the part of the
SOEs to reduce fees but not a fine; the investigation was effectively
suspended.310
Finally, procedural safeguards appear to be less developed in China
than in other jurisdictions, including Hong Kong, which has developed
strict due process procedures. As discussed above,311 until recently, direct
reporting by the agencies has been haphazard, obliging researchers to rely
on second-hand accounts. Even high-profile decisions of the SAMR, such
as Alibaba, are relatively short on details. Further, although authorities
issue guidance, this is not always followed in practice. For example,
despite the authorities’ guidance that only one applicant should receive
total immunity under the Leniency Policy, in fact immunity has been
granted to more than one party. 312 Overall, therefore, the Chinese
authorities enjoy a level of discretion unprecedented in other jurisdictions.
IV.

SPEED, EFFECTIVE
ACTION

REMEDIES,

AND

REGULATORY

Comparing the applicable laws and practice of the competition
authorities in Hong Kong and in China also invites comparison of the
efficiency of investigations and effectiveness of the remedies adopted. In
subsection A below, data on the length of the judicial process is used to
conclude that investigations in Hong Kong are likely to take on average
about as long as the average for investigations in other jurisdictions,
notably the European Union. In Hong Kong, the parties and the HKCC
exercise their rights to appeal vigorously. In China, the incredible speed in
issuing decisions in Alibaba and Meituan is not matched by the (still
impressive) speed of other investigations, particularly by AMEAs at the
309
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Evidence from Chinese Antitrust, 237 CHINA Q. 174 (2019).
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See infra app.
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local level. The analysis of the three abuse of dominance cases above313
indicates that speed is not achieved at the expense of thorough legal
analysis, but by focusing on narrow conduct in a market where dominance
of the platform is not in doubt. This could be a blueprint for authorities in
other countries seeking to reach a decision in cases where speed is of the
essence, for example to signal that a particular practice is not acceptable in
a dynamic, fast-paced market that is still developing.
Still, if competition law remedies are adopted alongside fines, they
should be proportionate to the issues identified and seek to restore
competition. The analysis of behavioral remedies in Hong Kong and in
China in subsection B below shows that the authorities take a high-level
approach. Particularly in China, it is difficult to see how the remedies
imposed in Alibaba or Meituan could address competition-related concerns
effectively.
It is possible that China intends to tackle the root causes of
competition concerns through forthcoming regulation, rather than
competition law. If so, China could adopt a competition and regulation
model under which competition law is intended mostly to serve as a
mechanism to punish infringers (rather than to remedy the concerns), and
regulation (including penalty for non-compliance) to address market
failures. At a time where regulation for Big Tech is on the cards
internationally, authorities the world over will have access to an expanded
toolkit, allowing them to adopt the same competition and regulation
approach. This article suggests this approach as a possible way forward,
considered further in subsection C.
A.

Length of Antitrust Procedure in Hong Kong and China
1.

Hong Kong: not that fast

As aforementioned,314 there is evidence that adversarial systems are
“often more expensive and protracted” 315 than administrative ones.
Looking at the judgment of the HKCT, the length of the judicial process
from beginning of the proceedings before the HKCT to issuance of the
penalty judgment lasts, on average, two years and two months. The slowest
was three years and nine months, in Nutanix. The quickest was ten months
from case filing, in Quantr.
Judicial resolution is, however, only the final part of an
investigation. As the HKCC does not publicize the exact date of
commencement of its investigations, it is difficult to know the average
313
314
315

See supra Section I.B.
See supra section III.A.
Nam, supra note 248, at 328.
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length of a procedure from the time that the parties first become aware that
they are under investigation, to the HKCT issuing a penalty judgment.
Considering the need for the HKCC to collect the evidence and instruct
proceedings, it would not be unreasonable to speculate that the average
length of investigations in Hong Kong to date would have been at least
around four years, which is also the average for European Commission
(administrative) antitrust investigations.316
The timing of the judicial process in the main cases in Hong Kong
is detailed below. A number of appeals against HKCT’s judgments are
pending.
In the much-awaited abuse of dominance Linde judgment, the
HKCC filed the case on December 21, 2020. 317 At the time of writing
(April 2022, one years, and four months after commencement of
proceedings), the case is pending.
In Nutanix, 318 the HKCC commenced proceedings on March 23,
2017.319 The HKCT handed down its liability judgment on May 17, 2019,
and the penalty judgment on December 16, 2020,320 three years, and nine
months after commencement of the proceedings.
In W. Hing Construction Company, 321 the HKCC commenced
proceedings on August 14, 2017. 322 This was the first of three cases
brought for cartel behavior in the renovation of Hong Kong public housing
estates (the First Decoration Contractors case). The HKCT issued its
liability judgment on May 17, 2019, the same day as in Nutanix, and its
penalty judgment on April 29, 2020 (two years, and eight months after
commencement of the proceedings). One of the defendants appealed the
decision, but the appeal was dismissed. The HKCC is also appealing the
HKCT’s penalty judgment that some respondents should receive a onethird discount on the penalties because they subcontracted the work to a
third party.323

316
Special Report of the European Court of Auditors on The Commission’s EU Merger Control
and Antitrust Proceedings: A Need to Scale Up Market Oversight, at ¶ 54 (2020),
https://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/SR20_24/SR_Competition_policy_EN.pdf
317
Competition Comm’n Press Release, supra note 48.
318
Competition Comm’n v. Nutanix Hong Kong Ltd., CTEA 1/2017 (H.K.).
319
Press Release, H.K. Competition Comm’n, Competition Commission Takes Bid-Rigging Case
to Competition Tribunal (Mar. 23, 2017), https://www.compcomm.hk/en/media/press/files/20170323_
Competition_Commission_takes_bid_rigging_case_to_Competition_Tribunal_e.pdf.
320
COMPETITION COMM’N 2020/2021 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 183.
321
Competition Comm’n v. W. Hing Construction Company Ltd., [2018] H.K.C.T. 2 (H.K.).
322
Press Release, H.K. Competition Comm’n, Competition Commission Takes Market Sharing
and Price Fixing Case to Competition Tribunal (Aug. 14, 2017), https://www.compcomm.hk/en/media/
press/files/20170814_Competition_Commission_takes_market_shari.pdf [hereinafter HKCC Press
Release, Market Sharing and Price Fixing].
323
COMPETITION COMM’N 2020/2021 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 183, at 30.
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In Kam Kwong Engineering Company, 324 the HKCC commenced
proceedings on September 6, 2018.325 This was the second of three cases
for cartel behavior in the renovation of Hong Kong public housing estates
(the Second Decoration Contractors case). Following the judgment in W.
Hing Construction Company, some of the respondents agreed to admit
liability. Jointly with the Commission, they applied to the HKCT to dispose
of the proceedings by consent, in a procedure that became known as the
Kam Kwon procedure. The liabilities of five respondents were established
by September 2020.326
In the Third Decoration Contractors case, Fungs E& M
Engineering,327 concerning cartel behavior in the renovation of Hong Kong
public housing estates, the HKCC commenced proceedings on July 3,
2019. All respondents agreed to adopt the Kam Kwong procedure, and on
October 14, 2020, the HKCT issued a liability judgment based on agreed
statements of fact. In judgments dated October 30, 2020, and January 5,
2021, one and a half years after commencement of the proceedings, the
HKCT decided on sanctions. Six contractors and two individuals were
ordered to pay fines and one individual was given a twenty-two-month
disqualification order.328
In Quantr,329 proceedings were begun by the HKCC on January 22,
2020. Liability was resolved pursuant to the Kam Kwong procedure and
the Tribunal handed down penalty judgment on November 3, 2020. As
discussed above, one party investigated, Nintex Proprietary Limited,
accepted the infringement notice, adopted compliance measures for two
years, and thus avoided a pecuniary fine. The HKCT ordered Quantr to pay
a penalty fee of HK$37,702.76 and the HKCC’s legal costs. Quantr also
agreed to a set of compliance measures for three years. This case was
started by a leniency application and is the first case in Hong Kong to
include behavioral remedies as part of a settlement package endorsed by
the HKCT. It is also “the fastest case resolved by way of settlement[,]”330
in which the HKCT “gave the orders sought by the parties within 10
months from case filing[.]”331

324

Competition Comm’n v. Kam Kwong Engineering Co. Ltd., [2020] 4 H.K.L.R.D. 61 (H.K.).
Press Release, H.K. Competition Comm’n, Competition Commission Takes Renovation Cartel
Case to Competition Tribunal (Sept. 6, 2018), https://www.compcomm.hk/en/media/press/files/Compet
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Competition Comm’n v. Fungs E&M Eng’g Co. Ltd., [2020] H.K.C.T. 5 (H.K.).
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HKCC Press Release, Market Sharing and Price Fixing, supra note 322, at 32.
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Competition Comm’n v. Quantr Ltd., [2020] 5 H.K.L.R.D. 528 (H.K.).
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China: remarkable speed, with some nuances

The analysis undertaken shows that in China, it generally takes
competition authorities at the local level longer to reach a decision than it
does the central authorities (the SAMR and its predecessors). This finding
is likely due to the greater expertise and focus available at the central level,
as local authorities have a number of functions besides antitrust
enforcement.
As seen above, it took the Shanghai AMR eighteen months to reach
a decision in Sherpa’s. This is remarkable, both compared to the situation
in Hong Kong detailed above, and especially when compared to the
average of around four years for the European Union, 332 which can be
longer for cartel investigations and complex anticompetitive cases. 333
However, the decision against Alibaba was reached in less than five
months,334 and the decision against Meituan in six months. This is truly
impressive.
In terms of cartel investigations, the Chinese case law review reveals
eleven cases where information as to the length of the investigation is
available. Based on this, the competition authorities appear to take, on
average, about two years to conclude an investigation in price-fixing cases
in China.
Among those reviewed, the longest investigation, the Guangxi
Administration for Industry and Commerce (AIC) proceedings in the
Hechi Insurance Cartel,335 lasted three and a half years, from December
2013 to March 20, 2017. The case ultimately led to fines of five percent of
the revenue of nine insurance companies in 2013 and of RMB100,000
against the Hechi Insurance Association. In the Wuhan Car Insurance
Cartel,336 the Hubei AIC fined the Hubei Insurance association and four
enterprises after an investigation that lasted more than three years, from
March 2013 to May 2016. Similarly, the Zhejiang AIC took more than
three years to conclude its investigation of the Shangyu Concrete Industry
Cartel, from August 2011 to September 2014. 337 This resulted in fines
against the industry association and eight members. By contrast, it took
only just over one year (from August 2014 to December 2015) for the

332
Special Report No. 24/2020 of the European Court of Auditors on the Commission’s EU Merger
Control and Antitrust Proceedings: A Need to Scale Up Market Oversight (Nov. 19, 2020), https://ww
w.eca.europa.eu/en/Pages/DocItem.aspx?did=56835.
333
Id. at 54.
334
The investigation started in December 2020 and the decision is dated April 10, 2021.
335
See COMPETITION BULLETIN JUNE 2017, supra note 303, at 4.
336
JINGYUAN MA, COMPETITION LAW IN CHINA: A LAW AND ECONOMICS PERSPECTIVE 73 (2020).
337
See COMPETITION BULLETIN JAN./FEB. 2015, supra note 24, at 5.
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central NDRC to impose fines against eight companies involved in the
high-profile international Roll-on/Roll-off Freight Services Cartel.338
B.

Effectiveness of Remedies

Quite apart from the issues surrounding the imposition of fines,
which have been dealt with above, 339 in Hong Kong and in China the
authorities have sought to impose behavioral remedies. As has been
noted,340 imposition of remedies in antitrust actions should not only punish
the infringers but also restore competition in the relevant market.341 So far,
in Hong Kong it seems that the adoption of behavioral remedies has been
confined to committing infringers to adopt internal compliance
measures.342
In China, the behavioral remedies imposed by the SAMR in Alibaba,
Sherpa’s and Meituan, appear to be simultaneously narrow for the purpose
of restoring competition, as befits the narrow focus of the investigation;
and wide, going beyond the scope of antitrust scrutiny, as Chinese
authorities can do, given their interdependencies. 343 In Alibaba, the
Administrative Instruction 344 obliges the company to “carry out a
comprehensive and in-depth self-examination against the AML[,]”345 meet
various requirements to ensure that they do not exclude or restrict
competition, 346 adopt internal governance 347 and compliance systems, 348
and notify mergers. Alibaba is required to adopt a rectification plan and
submit compliance reports for three years. As has been remarked, “there is
not much in there as far as restorative remedies go, meaning that the
measures are unlikely to reduce the profitability of the illegal conduct.”349
In Sherpa’s, the company proactively issued a statement committing to
implementing a rectification plan. 350 In Meituan, the company has to
submit compliance report similar to the requirements in Alibaba but in
addition, they are asked to commit to improving the working conditions of
338

See Gu & Sun, supra note 153.
See infra Section I.D.
340
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341
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343
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344
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350
Sherpa’s fined $178,351 for monopoly behaviors in China in 2020, GLOB. TIMES (Apr. 12,
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their drivers. A remedy of this kind would likely be ultra vires the
jurisdiction of most competition authorities and be challenged in countries
with a tradition of robust judicial review of administrative action. It also
introduces an extraneous element that detracts from addressing the market
concerns.
C.

A Three-Pronged Approach?

Looking at legislative changes in China in the whole, alongside the
antitrust crack-down against Big Tech, the SAMR is seeking to introduce
regulatory measures to be imposed on “super platforms.” In October 2021,
it published draft Guidelines for the Classification of Platforms (“Draft
Classification Guidelines”) and draft Guidelines on the Responsibility of
Internet Platforms (“Draft Responsibilities Guidelines”). 351 A detailed
analysis of these draft Guidelines is beyond the scope of this article,352 but
the system envisaged would first identify those platforms that, by virtue of
factors such as number of users, market valuation, or essentiality of
services offered to competitors, are presumed to have market power. Under
these proposals, super platforms should be subject to a number of
requirements such as to ensure interoperability and data protection, among
others. The system is comparable to similar regulatory proposals in other
jurisdictions, notably in the European Union, where under the Digital
Markets Act, 353 “digital gatekeepers” will be subject to wide-ranging
regulatory obligations.
This article proposes a three-pronged approach for investigating
competition concerns by Big Tech.
Firstly, swift action by the competition authorities can be achieved
by zooming in on narrow, well-understood instances of abuse of
dominance. This focused approach limits the complexity of the theory of
harm to be proven, reducing the time it takes to issue a decision. In fastmoving, dynamic markets where the need to act swiftly is greater, it is more
effective to issue an early, easily understood decision than to try to carry
out investigations on multiple markets and novel theories of harm. The
parties to the investigation must have access to a robust system of appeals
and must be able to put forward evidence as to the objective justification

351

Guidelines for the Classification and Grading of Internet Platforms (Draft for Comments) (互
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of their practices, if any. Particularly in novel cases, these are necessary
measures to reduce the risk of Type I errors.
Secondly, competition authorities should still seek to execute
comprehensive investigations in cases that require a formulation and
assessment of novel theories of harm across a number of markets, leading
to the imposition of hefty fines. Bringing unavoidably time-consuming and
resource intensive cases is necessary for the development of antitrust
analysis.
Thirdly, regulation can be used to identify and address the root
causes of the observed anticompetitive behavior and impose appropriate
remedies alongside the competition law assessment of individual cases in
an overarching competition and regulation framework of intervention.
CONCLUSION
A comparative review of the competition laws in China and in Hong
Kong demonstrates that, whatever the method of enforcement and the
institutional set-up, adversarial systems still need to provide the
competition authorities with the tools they need for enforcement and
detection. Administrative systems need the corrective power of judicial
scrutiny and procedural limits to the discretion of the authorities. The two
aspects go together.
Unless businesses and individuals understand that there are
significant penalties for non-compliance, they will be unlikely to take
antitrust seriously. This is a risk in Hong Kong, where the adversarial
system operates within significant constraints, in terms of coverage of the
law (particularly of merger control), enforcement (specifically, the need to
issue warning notices and the mandatory statutory exemptions for de
minimis agreements), and punishment of violations (with generally low
sanctions and a high burden of proof for the HKCC to discharge).
However, unless a regime is subject to appropriate checks and balances, it
may end up prioritizing “swift and decisive intervention” 354 over the
importance of fairness and “getting it right[.]”355 This is a risk in China,
where the administrative system operates outside the constraints of robust
judicial scrutiny and agencies are interlinked across different functions and
sectors, highlighting the danger of prosecutorial bias that is inherent in any
administrative system. This aspect will be further exacerbated when the
AML Amendment Proposals 356 will become law, as the competition
authorities will obtain greater powers to sanction and intervene.

354
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356
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Some aspects of the enforcement practice of the SAMR, notably the
focus on a specific abusive conduct in a market where the dominance of
the players is beyond doubt, could be adopted by other competition
authorities seeking to speed up their investigations to send a clear signal
that certain conduct will not be tolerated. Antitrust and regulation could
work hand-in-hand for swift actions against infringers and for tackling the
causes of market imperfections. However, there remains a risk that
policymakers the world over will see the competition aspects in isolation.
Dazzled by the speed of action of the SAMR and the AMEAs against the
perceived market power of Big Tech in China, they could make the case
for expanding the powers of the competition authorities and reduce
procedural protections, including availability of judicial review, forgetting
that mastery of details and fairness also matter.
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APPENDIX
Reports of Cases and Investigations by Competition Authorities in China
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

8.
9.

10.

Xiamen Courier Industry Price Self-Discipline Convention
Cartel. MELBOURNE L. SCH., CHINA COMPETITION BULLETIN
MARCH/APRIL 2014, 5 (Allan Fels. et al. eds., 31st ed. 2014).
Ningxia Courier Companies Cartel. MELBOURNE L. SCH., CHINA
COMPETITION BULLETIN JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2015, 6 (Allan Fels. et
al. eds., 35th ed. 2015).
Wuxi Quarry Operators Cartel. MELBOURNE L. SCH., CHINA
COMPETITION BULLETIN JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2015, 6 (Allan Fels. et
al. eds., 35th ed. 2015).
Nanjing Concrete Industry Cartel. MELBOURNE L. SCH., CHINA
COMPETITION BULLETIN JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2015, 9 (Allan Fels. et
al. eds., 35th ed. 2015).
Shangyu Concrete Industry Cartel. MELBOURNE L. SCH., CHINA
COMPETITION BULLETIN JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2015, 9 (Allan Fels. et
al. eds., 35th ed. 2015).
Guandong Nissan Distributors Cartel. MELBOURNE L. SCH.,
CHINA COMPETITION BULLETIN SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2015, 6 (Allan
Fels et al. eds., 39th ed. 2015).
Infant Formula Milk Cartel. HANNAH HA ET AL., China, in
ENFORCEMENT, APPEALS & DAMAGES ACTIONS 37, 42 (Nigel Parr &
Euan Burrows eds., 2014); see also ANGELA H. ZHANG, CHINESE
ANTITRUST EXCEPTIONALISM: HOW THE RISE OF CHINA
CHALLENGES GLOBAL REGULATION 43–44, 81–82 (2021).
Automakers Cartel. Samson Yuen, Taming the “Foreign Tigers:”
China’s Anti-Trust Crusade Against Multinational Companies, 4
CHINA PERSPECTIVES 53, 53 (2014).
12 Japanese Auto Parts and Bearing Manufacturers Cartel.
Michael Gu & Sihui Sun, NRDC Imposes Record Fines on 12
Japanese Auto Parts and Bearing Manufacturers, LEXOLOGY
(Sept. 25, 2014), https://www.lexology.com/commentary/competiti
on-antitrust/china/anjie-law-firm/ndrc-imposes-record-fines-on-12japanese-auto-parts-and-bearing-manufacturers; see also
MELBOURNE L. SCH. CHINA COMPETITION BULLETIN JULY/AUGUST
2014, 2 (Allan Fels et al. eds., 33d ed. 2014).
Aerated Bricks Cartel. MELBOURNE L. SCH., CHINA COMPETITION
BULLETIN JULY/AUGUST 2014, 3 (Allen Fels et al. eds., 33d ed.
2014).
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Inner Mongolia Fireworks and Firecrackers Cartel. MELBOURNE
L. SCH., CHINA COMPETITION BULLETIN JULY/AUGUST 2014, 2
(Allen Fels. et al. eds., 33d ed. 2014).
Wuhan BMW Distributors Cartel. MELBOURNE L. SCH., CHINA
COMPETITION BULLETIN JULY/AUGUST 2014, 2 (Allen Fels. et al.
eds., 33d ed. 2014).
Mayang Shale Brick Cartel. MELBOURNE L. SCH., CHINA
COMPETITION BULLETIN MAY/JUNE 2015, 5 (Allen Fels. et al. eds.,
37th ed. 2015).
Yunnan Telecoms Administrative Monopoly Case. MELBOURNE
L. SCH., CHINA COMPETITION BULLETIN MAY/JUNE 2015, 5 (Allen
Fels. et al. eds., 37th ed. 2015).
Roll-on/Roll-off Services Cartel. Michael Gu & Sihui Sun, NDRC
Rules in First International Shipping Company Monopoly Case,
LEXOLOGY (Aug. 4, 2016), https://www.lexology.com/commentary
/competition-antitrust/china/anjie-law-firm/ndrc-rules-in-firstinternational-shipping-company-monopoly-case.
Tableware Disinfection Cartel. Alert Memorandum from Cleary
Gottlieb on the First Price Cartel Cases Under the Chinese AML
(May 21, 2010), https://www.clearygottlieb.com/-/media/organizearchive/cgsh/files/publication-pdfs/first-price-cartel-cases-underthe-chinese-aml.pdf.
Rice Noodles Cartel. JINGYUAN MA, COMPETITION LAW IN CHINA:
A LAW AND ECONOMICS PERSPECTIVE 67 (2020); see also Xue Qiang
& Yang Xixi, Anti-Cartel Law and Enforcement in China: A Survey,
in CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW: THE FIRST FIVE YEARS §
6.03[A][1] (Adrian Emch & David Stallibrass eds., 2013).
LCD Panel Manufacturing Cartel. Xue Qiang & Yang Xixi, AntiCartel Law and Enforcement in China: A Survey, in CHINA ANTIMONOPOLY LAW: THE FIRST FIVE YEARS § 6.03[A][8] (Adrian Emch
& David Stallibrass eds., 2013).
Sea Sand Cartel. Xue Qiang & Yang Xixi, Anti-Cartel Law and
Enforcement in China: A Survey, in CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW:
THE FIRST FIVE YEARS § 6.03[A][7] (Adrian Emch & David
Stallibrass eds., 2013).
Fuyang Paper Manufacturing Cartel. Xue Qiang & Yang Xixi,
Anti-Cartel Law and Enforcement in China: A Survey, in CHINA
ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW: THE FIRST FIVE YEARS § 6.03[A][5] (Adrian
Emch & David Stallibrass eds., 2013).
Package Industry Cartel. Xue Qiang & Yang Xixi, Anti-Cartel
Law and Enforcement in China: A Survey, in CHINA ANTIMONOPOLY LAW: THE FIRST FIVE YEARS § 6.03[A][6] (Adrian Emch
& David Stallibrass eds., 2013).
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Book Resale Price Cartel. Xue Qiang & Yang Xixi, Anti-Cartel
Law and Enforcement in China: A Survey, in CHINA ANTIMONOPOLY LAW: THE FIRST FIVE YEARS § 6.03[A][3] (Adrian Emch
& David Stallibrass eds., 2013).
Zhejiang Car Insurance Cartel. MELBOURNE L. SCH.,
COMPETITION BULLETIN SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2014, 1 (Allan Fels et
al. eds., 34th ed. 2014).
Jilin Cement Clinker Cartel. MELBOURNE L. SCH., COMPETITION
BULLETIN SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2014, 2 (Allan Fels et al. eds., 34th
ed. 2014).
Driving School Associations Cartel. MELBOURNE L. SCH.,
COMPETITION BULLETIN JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2014, 4 (Allan Fels et
al. eds., 30th ed. 2014).
Qiqihar City Bathhouses Cartel. MELBOURNE L. SCH.,
COMPETITION BULLETIN MARCH/APRIL 2015, 4 (Allan Fels et al.
eds., 36th ed. 2015).
Jiangsu Mercedes-Benz Distributers Cartel. MELBOURNE L.
SCH., COMPETITION BULLETIN MARCH/APRIL 2015, 3 (Allan Fels et
al. eds., 36th ed. 2015).
Shandong GPS Platform Administrative Monopoly Case.
MELBOURNE L. SCH., COMPETITION BULLETIN MARCH/APRIL 2015,
3 (Allan Fels et al. eds., 36th ed. 2015).
Gansu GPS Platform Administrative Monopoly Case.
MELBOURNE L. SCH., COMPETITION BULLETIN JANUARY/FEBRUARY
2016 (Allan Fels et al. eds., 40th ed. 2016).
Wuwei Secondary Car Maintenance Services Cartel.
MELBOURNE L. SCH., COMPETITION BULLETIN JANUARY/FEBRUARY
2016, 8 (Allan Fels et al. eds., 40th ed. 2016).
Yongzhou Concrete Industry Cartel. MELBOURNE L. SCH.,
COMPETITION BULLETIN JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2016, 8 (Allan Fels et
al. eds., 40th ed. 2016).
Jiangxi Car Insurance Cartel. MELBOURNE L. SCH., COMPETITION
BULLETIN JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2016, 10 (Allan Fels et al. eds., 40th
ed. 2016).
Allopurinol Tablets Cartel. MELBOURNE L. SCH., COMPETITION
BULLETIN JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2016, 11 (Allan Fels et al. eds., 40th
ed. 2016).
Tianjin Port Yard Cartel. MORGAN LEWIS, GLOBAL CARTEL
ENFORCEMENT REPORT 17 (2018), https://www.morganlewis.com/
documents/m/documents/cartel/cartel-report_end2018_190022.pdf.
Tallying Services Cartel. MORGAN LEWIS, GLOBAL CARTEL
ENFORCEMENT REPORT 18 (2018), https://www.morganlewis.com/
documents/m/documents/cartel/cartel-report_end2018_190022.pdf.
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Guangdong River Sand Mining. MORGAN LEWIS, GLOBAL
CARTEL ENFORCEMENT REPORT 18 (2018), https://www.morganle
wis.com/documents/m/documents/cartel/cartel-report_end2018_19
0022.pdf.
Henan Construction Engineering Quality Inspection. MORGAN
LEWIS, GLOBAL CARTEL ENFORCEMENT REPORT 19 (2018), https://
www.morganlewis.com/documents/m/documents/cartel/cartelreport_end2018_190022.pdf.
Gas Management Cartel. MORGAN LEWIS, GLOBAL CARTEL
ENFORCEMENT REPORT 18 (2018), https://www.morganlewis.com/
documents/m/documents/cartel/cartel-report_end2018_190022.pdf.
Guangdong Gas Management Cartel. MORGAN LEWIS, GLOBAL
CARTEL ENFORCEMENT REPORT 18 (2018), https://www.morganle
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